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The Japanese economy has been stagnant for more than ten years. The
average growth rate from 1993 to 2003 is just above 1 percent. Since 1998,
the inﬂation rate, either measured by gross domestic product (GDP) deﬂa-
tor or Consumer Price Index (CPI), has been negative. The deﬂation has
brought the CPI price level by the end of 2003 to 3 percent below the 1997
level. During the same period, the U.S. CPI has increased by 12 percent.
Due to virtually zero growth and deﬂation, the Japanese nominal GDP had
shrunk by 4 percent from 1997 to 2002, while during the same period, nom-
inal GDP of the United States has increased by 25 percent.
Many problems have been pointed to as contributing factors that ex-
plain the “lost decade” in Japan. The burst bubble and the nonperforming
loans problem are often blamed for the poor performance of the early stage
of the stagnation. By 2003, land and stock price indexes have fallen to
between one-third and one-fourth of the respective peak in 1989–91. Slow
policy responses to the nonperforming loan problem resulted in the bank-
ing crisis of 1997–98, and the ﬁnancial sector is still weak. The consump-
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garded as a ﬁscal policy mistake. Slow structural reform in regulated sec-
tors is another problem for the Japanese economy, which has not beneﬁted
from the information and communication technology (ICT) advances that
propelled the U.S. economy.
But the most likely cause for deﬂation in Japan is a failure of monetary
policy, since inﬂation or deﬂation is ultimately a monetary phenomenon.
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) was unable to stop the inﬂation rate from turn-
ing negative, despite its various eﬀorts. The uncollateralized call rate (the
policy interest rate that corresponds to the Federal Funds rate of the
United States) was lowered to virtually zero in February–March 1999. The
BOJ raised the call rate to 0.25 percent in August 2000 in false expectation
of continuing economic expansion, against protests from the government
and many economists. The interest rate was lowered to zero again in March
2001, with an additional measure of quantitative easing, setting the target
of current account (reserves) of commercial banks at the BOJ in excess of
required reserves. The target amount of current account was initially set at
5 trillion yen, while the required reserves was about 4 trillion yen. The tar-
get amount has been raised in several steps to a range of 30–35 trillion yen
by January 2004. In addition to raising the target amount of current ac-
count at the BOJ, the bank expanded the amount of monthly outright pur-
chase of long-term government bonds from 400 billion yen to 600 billion
yen in August 2001, and in several steps to 1,200 billion yen in October 2002.
In addition, purchases of some of private debts, including asset-backed se-
curities (ABS), have been introduced.
By 2002, the economy and the ﬁnancial institutions weakened again.
Deﬂationary expectations were setting in, and consumption and invest-
ment were depressed. Aggregate demand fell short of potential output, and
the widened output gap depressed prices, reinforcing deﬂationary expec-
tations. There did not seem to be a solution to the deﬂationary spiral.
When the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) was ﬁrst introduced in Febru-
ary 1999, it was intended to continue until “deﬂationary concern is dis-
pelled.” It was then lifted in August 2000. When it was reintroduced in
March 2001, it was declared to continue until “the inﬂation rate becomes
stably above zero.” The condition was further elaborated in October 2003,
so that the necessary condition for the exit from ZIRP is that the CPI in-
ﬂation rate becomes zero or above for a few months and there was no fore-
cast by the board members of falling back to deﬂation. The determination
to ﬁght deﬂation seems to have been strengthened. Given that deﬂation
was not over at the time of ZIRP termination and that the ZIRP had to be
reinstated, the interest rate hike of August 2000 was clearly a mistake.
Lively debates have taken place as to what the BOJ could have done to
prevent deﬂation from occurring and getting worse, and on what the BOJ
could do to get out of deﬂation. Many academics and policymakers, in-
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Japan’s actions were too little too late, at least in retrospect, in preventing
deﬂation from emerging and ﬁghting out of deﬂation. Many academic crit-
ics have been arguing for nonconventional monetary policy in combating
deﬂation: for example, purchasing long-term bonds, equities, foreign-
currency-denominated bonds, and nonperforming loans. However, it has
been pointed out that the transmission channel of nonconventional mone-
tary policy is unclear.
Inﬂation targeting has also been proposed as a tool to promote an in-
dependent central bank and to help get out of deﬂation. Namely, a credible
announcement of inﬂation targeting, of say 1 to 3 percent, would make in-
ﬂation expectations become higher, so that the deﬂationary spiral would be
broken. A combination of inﬂation targeting as a communication and an-
choring device with nonconventional policies was advocated by academic
work in the past.1
However, the BOJ has opposed inﬂation targeting, with economists in
the Bank of Japan arguing that there are no clear instruments to get out of
deﬂation, and a mere announcement without instruments would not con-
vince market participants to change their inﬂation expectations. But, oth-
ers in the bank have suggested that the commitment to keep the zero inter-
est rate policy until the inﬂation rate becomes stably above zero has similar
eﬀects to inﬂation targeting.
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 will review Japa-
nese monetary policy over the last two decades. The former concentrates 
on the period of bubble and burst (1985–1997), and the latter examines the
issue under the new law of the BOJ (1998–). Section 4.4 discusses whether
estimates of Taylor rules can be used to assess Japanese monetary policy.
Section 4.5 discusses the costs of deﬂation. Section 4.6 examines monetary-
policy actions to prevent deﬂation, and Section 4.7 surveys the literature on
monetary policy to cure deﬂation and discusses nonconventional monetary-
policy measures. Section 4.8 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Monetary Policy and the Bubble
4.2.1 Bubble and Burst
Some researchers go back to the bubble period, 1985–90, as a source of
the Japanese stagnation in the 1990s. Since the bubble occurred and burst,
the Japanese economy fell into a diﬃcult position of having nonperform-
ing loans that led to the banking crisis. Some economists seem to believe
that there was a mistake in monetary policy in the 1980s, and once the burst
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1. See Ito (2000, 2001), Kazumasa Iwata (2002), and Kikuo Iwata (2001, 2002) in the books
written in Japanese.bubble occurred, monetary policy became powerless in the 1990s, because
the transmission channel from the interest rate policy to the real economy
was no longer operational. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate to start the
story of deﬂation from the bubble years.
In retrospect, it is obvious that the Japanese economy was experiencing
a bubble economy: the stock price index and the land price index quadru-
pled from 1983 to 1989. The stock prices index (Nikkei 225) rose from
10,000 yen at the end of 1983 to near 40,000 at the end of 1989. The eco-
nomic growth rate was approaching 5 percent, surpassing the average of 4
percent from 1975 to 1989, and the tax revenues were increasing to close a
ﬁscal gap that had plagued the economy for two decades. At the end of the
1980s, many economists as well as policymakers around the world were
praising the Japanese economy for its excellent performance.2 Although a
few economists raised concerns, many ﬁnancial analysts and bankers were
not alarmed at the apparent high value of stocks and land compared to
their cash-ﬂow earning. Land and stock price movements from 1970 to
2003 are shown in ﬁgure 4.1.
The inﬂation rate had gradually come down from 12 percent in 1974 to
below 4 percent in 1978. The inﬂation rate suddenly went up to about 8 per-
cent in 1979 due to the second oil crisis. However, the CPI inﬂation rate was
quickly brought down to below 3 percent in 1982. The inﬂation rate ﬂuc-
tuated at the low range of 0–3 percent for the rest of the 1980s. The inﬂa-
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2. See Ito (1992) for a comprehensive explanation of the Japanese economy up to 1991.
Fig. 4.1 Land prices and stock prices, 1970–2003tion performance of Japan from 1976 to 1987, despite a lack of legal inde-
pendence of the BOJ, was often praised in the literature.3 Figure 4.2 shows
the CPI inﬂation rate (excluding fresh food), that is adjusted for the con-
sumption tax introduction in 1989, and the consumption tax rate increase
in 1997.
It is remarkable that during the bubble period, the CPI inﬂation rate re-
mained low. While asset prices were doubling and tripling in a few years,
the CPI inﬂation rate remained quite reasonable, prompting a diﬃcult
choice to the BOJ. Indeed, the BOJ did not start tightening until 1989. Al-
though the BOJ would not target asset prices, the burst bubble would make
monetary policy more diﬃcult—all with the beneﬁt of hindsight. The yen
appreciated from 260 yen/dollar in February 1985 to 150 yen/dollar in the
summer of 1986, of which some part was a movement toward an equilib-
rium and some part was overshooting. The sharp yen appreciation caused
a recession (due to a slump of exports) and imported disinﬂation. Interest
rates were lowered from 1986 to 1987 in part to help stimulate the economy
that was depressed by sharp yen appreciation.4Low interest rates were nec-
essary to prevent the yen from appreciating too much.
Monetary policy was ﬁnally tightened in 1989. The oﬃcial discount rate
(ODR) rose from 2.5 percent, where it had been since 1987, to 3.25 percent
in May 1989. The ODR rose to 3.75 percent in October and 4.25 percent in
December. Despite this rapid hike of the interest rate, the CPI inﬂation rate
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3. See, for example, Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (1997), for the view that the BOJ might have
had de facto independence and exercised it wisely.
4. See, for example, Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) for such a view. They seem to
blame international policy coordination, such as the Plaza Accord of September 1995 and the
Louvre Accord of February 1997, for the BOJ not acting in a timely manner.
Fig. 4.2 CPI inﬂation excluding fresh food and consumption tax, 1985–2002rose from 1 percent at the beginning of 1989 to 3 percent toward the end of
the same year. The oﬃcial discount rate was raised to 6.00 percent in Au-
gust 1990 (a 350 basis point hike in ﬁfteen months).
Stock prices peaked at the level of 39,000 in Nikkei 225 index at the end
of 1989. In tandem with the interest rate hike, regulatory tightening was
applied to stop increases in land prices including: limiting the increase in
bank lending to real estate related projects and companies in the spring of
1990, and raising taxes on realized capital gains from land investment.
Stock prices ﬁnally turned down from the ﬁrst trading day of 1990. The
stock price index declined by one-third from the end of 1989, the peak, to
the end of 1990. Stock prices continued to decline and the index lost 60 per-
cent of the peak level by the summer of 1992. Land prices started to decline
in 1991. The bubble had burst.
One may question whether monetary policy was too lax for too long
during the bubble experience, that is the second half of the 1980s. What if
monetary policy was tightened in 1988? Maybe that might have prevented
the inﬂation rate from rising too quickly to the 3 percent level at the end 
of 1989. The BOJ was most likely behind the curve. However, it probably
would not have had a measurable impact on the bubble process of stock
prices and land prices. Even if the interest rate had been hiked earlier, it is
unlikely that the expected return of purchasing an asset would not have
been aﬀected very much when the asset is in a bubble process.5
Those who emphasize the damage of burst bubble in the 1990s may ar-
gue that the mistake of monetary policy in the second half of the 1980s was
that it allowed the bubble to get bigger and bigger. There is no clear-cut an-
swer to the question of how monetary policy should respond to asset-price
inﬂation with a stable CPI inﬂation rate, as will be seen in the general dis-
cussion in section 4.2.3.
However, the dilemma of the monetary policy at the time was that CPI
inﬂation was indicating low inﬂation, mainly due to a sharp yen apprecia-
tion, from 260 yen/dollar in February 1985 to 150 yen/dollar in the summer
of 1986, and to 120 yen/dollar in December 1987. When the CPI inﬂation
rate is about 0.5 percent while the stock and land prices are increasing at
30 percent annually, what should monetary policy do? The low inﬂation
rate, which is below typical inﬂation targets of around 2 percent, might
suggest there is room for monetary easing, while stopping the asset-price
inﬂation requires tighter monetary policy. There seems to be a dilemma for
monetary policy.
There is a fundamental law in (linear model) economics that there should
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5. See Ito and Iwaisako (1996) for an interpretation of the Japanese bubble in the 1980s as
an application of stochastic bubbles. They diﬀerentiated the simulated eﬀects of a temporary
change in the interest rate and the simulated permanent change in the interest rate upon as-
set prices. They argue that unless the low interest rate in the late 1980s had been perceived to
be permanent, the large increase in asset prices could not have been explained.be at least two policy instruments to pursue two policy objectives. No per-
fect solution for the interest rate policy can be obtained to pursue both CPI
price stability and asset-price stability.
Assessment of monetary policy in Japan in 1987 and 1986 is diﬃcult.
Could one justify the monetary policy that lowered the discount rate to 2.5
percent in February 1987 and maintained it at 2.5 percent, then the record
low, until May 1989? One may argue that the BOJ should have applied tight
monetary policy in 1987 in order to curb asset-price inﬂation. But it would
have been diﬃcult to justify the action given the low CPI inﬂation rate, the
slow economic recovery from the yen-appreciation recession of 1986, and
the aftermath of Black Monday in October 1987. We are not conﬁdent that
preventing asset-price inﬂation was an overriding priority of the central
bank in 1987. On the other hand, the trade-oﬀ had disappeared in 1988
when both CPI price forecasts and asset-price movements now indicated
that at least modest tightening would have been justiﬁable. The BOJ was
probably behind the curve in 1988.
4.2.2 Bubble Overkill?
In the beginning of the asset-price decline, public opinion was favorable
toward monetary and regulatory policy to stop the bubble. Housing was
considered to have become too expensive to ordinary citizens, so stopping
the housing price from skyrocketing was considered to be a good thing.
Despite the burst of the bubble, robust consumption and investment con-
tinued in 1991. The GDP growth rate remained higher than 3 percent in
1990 and 1991.
The Japanese economy slowed down considerably in 1992. Stock prices
plummeted in the summer of 1992, to the level of 15,000 in Nikkei 225 in-
dex, losing more than 60 percent of the peak value in two and one-half
years. The quarter-to-quarter GDP growth rate became negative in the
spring–summer of 1992. Lending to the real estate sector from banks
slowed down after 1991 due to regulation, but there was a loophole. Lend-
ing via nonbank ﬁnancial institutions (such as leasing companies) contin-
ued and total lending to the real estate, construction, and nonbank sectors
remained high until the mid-1990s. Nonperforming loans, due to nonpay-
ment of interest by real estate companies, became a popular topic of busi-
ness discussion, but was not yet showing up in any banking statistics in the
ﬁrst half of the 1990s.
The discount rate was lowered to 5.5 percent in July 1991, to 5 percent
in November 1991, and to 4.5 percent in December 1991. The decline of
the ODR continued in 1992 and 1993. A ﬁscal stimulus package was intro-
duced in 1992 in response to the weakening economy. This was the begin-
ning of a series of ﬁscal stimulus packages.
The economy was stagnant from 1992 to 1994, with the growth rate be-
low 1.2 percent, three years in a row. Land prices continued to decline
Two Decades of Japanese Monetary Policy and the Deﬂation Problem 137steadily. The CPI inﬂation rate declined from just above 2 percent in the be-
ginning of 1992 to 0 percent by mid-1995. Monetary policy was relaxed in
1992 and 1993 in response to weakening of the economy. The ODR was
lowered from 4.5 percent to 3.75 percent in April 1992, to 3.25 percent in
July 1992, to 2.5 percent in February 1993, and to 1.75 percent in Septem-
ber 1993. There was no change in the ODR in 1994, but it was lowered to 1
percent in April 1995, and ﬁnally to 0.5 percent in September 1995.
The question from the viewpoint of preventing deﬂation is whether or
not the pace of the interest rate cut from 1992 to 1995 was quick enough.
The fact that the economy continued to be stagnant and the inﬂation rate
dropped to 0 percent suggested that the BOJ might have underestimated
deﬂationary forces.
During the period from 1992 to 1995, the nonperforming loans problem
became worse and worse. Many construction and real estate companies
were virtually bankrupt, since the market value of real estate in inventory
had become much lower than their purchase values, and cash ﬂows were
dwindling. As a result, these companies were having trouble making inter-
est payments on their bank loans. However, the banks, fearing that losses
would become apparent and having a false belief the real estate market
would rebound soon, kept lending to these companies that could not service
their debt—a practice that became known as “ever-greening.” The balance
sheets of corporations and banks were quickly deteriorating.
Smaller ﬁnancial institutions—housing loan companies, credit unions,
one regional bank—failed in 1995. The banking problem was worsening,
but no serious policy was introduced to address the problem. Since the se-
riousness was hidden behind murky accounting rules and a lenient bank
supervisor (the Ministry of Finance), the public was not informed of the
magnitude of the problem or a coming crisis. Since the public and politi-
cians were not alarmed, there was little sympathy toward any suggestions
for ﬁscal injections to recapitalize the banks.
Many economists called for introducing prompt corrective action for
weak institutions and ﬁscal injection, if necessary, for either closing insti-
tutions or rehabilitating them. But ﬁscal injection was politically diﬃcult.
Instead, in 1995, the Ministry of Finance on the one hand guaranteed all
deposits, suspending the deposit insurance ceiling, and on the other hand
declared that no major bank would fail.
In spite of a weak economy, the exchange rate was appreciating from
1993 to 1995. The exchange rate appreciated from 100 yen/dollar to 80 yen/
dollar in the spring of 1995, with no apparent macrofundamental reasons for
such a sudden move. The exchange rate appreciation dampened an expec-
tation of early recovery and contributed to disinﬂation and then deﬂation.
The economy started to grow in the second half of 1995, and the year
1996 turned out to be a good one, with the growth rate exceeding 3 percent.
The yen depreciated to a level above 110 yen/dollar, providing additional
support for a recovery. A fragile economic recovery of 1996 accelerated in
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crease of April 1997 induced consumers to accelerate big-ticket consump-
tion. In April 1997, the consumption tax rate was raised from 3 percent to
5 percent, and the temporary special income tax cut was allowed to expire,
both as planned. The growth rate signiﬁcantly slowed down in the second
half of 1997. This was the result of the Asian currency crisis, and the bank-
ing crisis of the Japanese economy in November. The economy continued
to deteriorate in 1998: the year 1998 recorded negative growth for the ﬁrst
time since 1976.
From 1997 to 1998, Japanese ﬁnancial markets suﬀered from a severe
crisis, as banks were losing capital due to high ratios of nonperforming
loans and falling asset prices. Three large banks—Hokkaido Takushoku,
Long-term Credit, and Nippon Credit—failed, and other banks were also
suﬀering from declining capital. Banks were curtailing lending and a severe
credit crunch was observed. The resulting negative eﬀects on aggregate de-
mand then pushed the economy into deﬂation.
The government ﬁnally decided to inject capital into the banks. The ﬁrst
capital injection in March 1998 turned out to be insuﬃcient but the second
capital injection of March 1999 ﬁnally calmed the market. Ito and Harada
(2000) showed that the Japan premium—a risk premium demanded by
western banks upon Japanese banks for interbank lending/borrowing—
disappeared after March 1999.
4.2.3 Asset Prices and Monetary Policy
In retrospect of 1985–2003, there are several questions on what the BOJ
should or could have done. The ﬁrst question is whether or not the BOJ
should have prevented the bubble. If all the trouble of the 1990s originates
from the bubble, stronger actions should have been taken against the asset-
price increases. This question relates to a new debate over the objective of
central banks.6 Some researchers, more than others, think that asset prices
should be considered as a part of price stability that is the sole objective of
many independent central banks. Cecchetti, et al. (2000) argued strongly
to put asset prices as direct measure of the goal of monetary policy.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) examined monetary policy in the presence
of asset-price bubbles, with application to Japan. They built a model with
an exogenous asset-price bubble, applied alternative monetary-policy
rules, and then estimated reaction functions for the Federal Reserve (FED)
and BOJ. They applied the Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1998) model to esti-
mate reaction functions for the FED and the BOJ. The model assumes ra-
tional expectation for estimating expected inﬂation rate that is used to cal-
culate the inﬂation rate gap. Their results indicate that the Japanese policy
was too tight from 1985 to 1988 and too lax from 1988 to 1990, fueling a
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6. A few conference volumes dedicated to this question have been published, see for ex-
ample, Hunter, Kaufman, and Pomerleano (2003); and Richards and Robinson (2003).stock bubble, and too tight, again, from 1992 until at least 1996. They ar-
gue that even without explicitly targeting the asset prices, the BOJ should
have tightened from 1998 to 1990, probably ending the bubble much earlier.
Okina and Shiratsuka (2002) criticized Bernanke and Gertler (1999) on
the grounds that Bernanke and Gertler used a forward-looking inﬂation
rate as expected inﬂation, but the inﬂation rate they used was not adjusted
for consumption tax rate changes. Okina and Shiratsuka argued that the
rapid increase of interest rate derived from the policy rule of Bernanke and
Gertler mainly resulted from the introduction of the consumption tax in
April 1989. The paper by Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka (2001) con-
tains a good review of why the bubble happened, how the BOJ reacted, and
what could have been done, from the angle of the central bank. In section
IV (Did the BOJ’s Monetary Policy Create the Bubble?) the authors take
the view that the BOJ lowered the interest rate from 1986 to 1987 to sup-
port the “policy coordination” framework, and to prevent the appreciation
of the yen. The paper then reviews the policy in 1988 and 1989.
There are many criticisms of the view that the central bank should pay
special attention to asset prices beyond their eﬀects on CPI. See, for ex-
ample, Mishkin (2001) and Mishkin and White (2003). Ito (2003) empha-
sizes the role of bank supervision, rather than monetary policy, for pre-
venting a bubble or managing a burst bubble.
The diﬃculty in using monetary policy (raising and lowering of the in-
terest rate) alone to prevent a bubble can be summarized as follows. First,
the central bank often would not know whether asset prices are rising due
to fundamentals or due to a bubble. Second, when the bubble is in force, it
would take a very high interest rate to pop the bubble, and that would
throw real variables into volatile ﬂuctuations. Those skeptics emphasize
the importance of supervision policy rather than monetary policy to main-
tain ﬁnancial stability.
Given that a bubble is created, the eﬀects from the bursting of the bubble
could be moderated by monetary policy. The question is whether the BOJ
was behind the curve from 1992 to 1995. The BOJ may have been too slow
to ease, possibly for fear of rekindling a bubble. Similarly, the bank may
have waited too long to adopt the ZIRP, possibly because it was an un-
precedented move. Would policy have been better if the bank adopted the
ZIRP earlier than February 1999?
4.3 New Bank of Japan
4.3.1 Monetary Policy of the Hayami Regime, 1998–2003
When the newly independent Bank of Japan started in April 1998, hopes
were high in that the BOJ would improve its performance and return to
what had been viewed as successful monetary policy in the preceding two
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lost credibility and suﬀered a serious conﬁdence problem. What hap-
pened? The short answers to these questions are two-fold. First, the policy
board members, led by Governor Hayami, misjudged the economic condi-
tions, maybe because they were too eager to go back to the “normal” situ-
ation where the interest rate is positive. The interest rate hike in August
2000 was a clear mistake of this kind. Second, the governor and fellow
board members took independence literally and refused to cooperate with
the government when the economic conditions called for such cooperation.
Since independence and early establishment of credibility were considered
so important, policy actions became conservative, timid, and tentative.
Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000, 173) called this the “independence trap.”
Even when policy was ﬁnally directed toward quantitative easing in March
2001, this policy was not explained adequately, especially because the BOJ
had claimed that it was likely to be ineﬀective. Therefore, the general public
viewed the BOJ as adopting a policy that the bank did not believe in. That
was hardly a good way of communicating with the market.
The old Bank of Japan, under the 1942 Law, was supposed to pursue
monetary policy in order to maximize economic potential (not price sta-
bility), and the governor could be replaced by the minister of ﬁnance, if the
governor did not follow the government’s instructions.7 A lack of inde-
pendence is often cited as a cause for an unusually high inﬂation rate,
about 30 percent, in 1973–74, in the wake of the ﬁrst oil crisis. After the in-
ﬂation of 1973–74, the BOJ had conducted prudent monetary policy,
achieving a gradual decline in the inﬂation rate. Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito
(1997; chap. 8) have praised the conduct of the BOJ, achieving a de facto
independence based on reputation. Japan was known to have been an
“outlier” in the relationship between the legal independence index and the
historical inﬂation rate.
The new law, the Bank of Japan Law of 1998, guaranteed the independ-
ence of the BOJ in its policy making and board member appointments.8
The law became eﬀective on 1 April 1998. At around the same time, Mr.
Hayami was appointed as governor, and Mr. Yamaguchi and Mr. Fujiwara
two deputy governors. Two policy board members were carried over from
the old law regime, but four new members were appointed in April 1998 to
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7. The 1942 Law speciﬁed that the BOJ conducts its operation “in order that the general
economic activities of the nation might adequately be enhanced” (Article 1). The objective of
the BOJ was “for achievement of national aims” (Article 2). These wordings should be un-
derstood in the context of the war when the bill was passed. See Cargill, Hutchinson, and Ito
(2000; chap. 4) for detailed comparison of the old and new Bank of Japan Laws.
8. The 1998 Law speciﬁes two pillars, “the pursuit of price stability, contributing to the
sound development of the national economy (Article 2),” and “maintenance of an orderly ﬁ-
nancial system (Article 1).” The absence of mentioning full employment, economic growth,
or exchange rate objectives suggests that price stability is the primary objective. Financial-
system stability is a shared responsibility with government.replace the old members and vacancy. Mr. Hayami, age seventy-two at the
time of new governor appointment, left the BOJ after serving for thirty-
four years on the international side of the bank, in 1981 (seventeen years
earlier) to go to a general trading company, Nissho-Iwai. After serving as
president and chairman of Nissho-Iwai, he had retired from the company
for several years, until he returned to the BOJ as governor. Deputy Gover-
nor Yamaguchi had climbed up the ladder in the BOJ with a reputation for
his knowledge about the core business of central banking. Deputy Gover-
nor Fujiwara was a former journalist. Governor Hayami was brought back
to the top position, partly because he was considered to be incorruptible in
the wake of a scandal at the Bank of Japan.9
The Japanese economy in the spring of 1998 was in the process of falling
into a serious recession and ﬁnancial instability. In November 1997, ﬁnan-
cial instability became prominent: one large bank and one small bank, a
large securities ﬁrm, and a medium-size securities ﬁrm all failed, and credit
lines among the Japanese ﬁnancial institutions, and between western ﬁ-
nancial institutions and Japanese ﬁnancial institutions became severely
limited. The Asian ﬁnancial crisis was spreading from Thailand to In-
donesia, to Korea, and to the region in general. Demand was falling and it
was clear that the economy was heading into a recession.10 The overnight
call rate, the market rate corresponding to the Federal Funds rate in the
United States, at the time was about 0.4–0.5 percent. This stance was main-
tained until 9 September 1998, when the target of the call rate was reduced
to 0.25 percent.11
Another major step was taken on 12 February 1999. The board decided
to lower the overnight call rate as low as possible, with an immediate action
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9. Many bank oﬃcials were implicated for inappropriate behavior of dining and golﬁng
with private-sector people. The scandal hit the media particularly hard in the ﬁrst three
months of 1997. High salaries, high severance pay, and large company housing also became a
target of criticism. One bank oﬃcial was arrested for taking bribes in return for leaking in-
formation to a securities ﬁrm. Governor Matsushita and Deputy Governor Fukui (who re-
turned as governor ﬁve years later) resigned to take responsibility in March 1998, days before
the new BOJ law took eﬀect. The oﬃcial who took bribes was dismissed from the Bank on
April 3, 1998.
10. In the spring of 1998, it was announced that the economy had just experienced the two
consecutive quarters of negative growth rates: –0.7 percent in 1997:IV and –0.3 percent in
1998:I. The currently available new SNA93 (System of National Accounts, following a United
Nations recommendation of 1993) available at [http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/qe034-2/
gdemenuja.html] does not show this:  0.7 percent in 1997:IV and –1.0 percent in 1998:I. The
diﬀerence is due to the diﬀerences in the base year, the estimation methods, and the seasonal
adjustment method. The point is that the BOJ and the government should have had a more
negative assessment of the economy at the time of Spring 1998.
11. “The Policy Board determined to further ease the stance of money market operations
for the inter-meeting period ahead as follows: The Bank of Japan will encourage the uncol-
lateralized overnight call rate to move on average around 0.25 percent” (Bank of Japan, An-
nouncement of Decisions, September 9, 1998).to lower it to 0.15 percent.12 This is the beginning of the so-called zero in-
terest rate policy (ZIRP). It was clear that the economy was in a very weak
state. At the time, the GDP growth rate was thought to have shrunk for ﬁve
consecutive quarters since 1997:IV.13
By the spring of 1999, the decline in economic activity became clearer—
the instability of the Japanese ﬁnancial system became acute as the Long-
term Credit Bank teetered on bankruptcy; bills to strengthen the ﬁnancial
system were debated in the Diet; and the international ﬁnancial system was
shaken by the de facto default of the Russian debts in August.14
After ZIRP was adopted, the board members were divided into three
groups, according to the disclosed minutes. Shinotsuka, who opposed
adopting ZIRP, thought that the interest rate should be raised, partly to
help pensioners. Nakahara, who had proposed lowering the interest rate
more aggressively than other members before February, frequently put for-
ward a motion to adopt quantitative easing and inﬂation targeting, as ac-
tions beyond ZIRP. Both proposals were voted down with only one vote in
favor. The majority did not recognize the need to adopt any further actions
between February and September.
Since the economy was not responding to the low interest rate, the gov-
ernment and business sectors began to press the BOJ to adopt more ag-
gressive quantitative easing. Just before the September 21, 1999 meeting of
the policy board, speculations were abundant in press predicting that the
policy board would adopt some sort of quantitative easing, possibly non-
sterilized intervention in the foreign exchange market in cooperation with
the Ministry of Finance. The market regarded that nonsterilized interven-
tion to be a signal that the BOJ would ﬁght deﬂation with unconventional
measures. The markets also focused on whether the BOJ would increase
the amount of money market liquidity on the settlement day that was two
days after the intervention.
The policy board reacted strongly to this speculation in the press. The
board issued the statement, in addition to a brief announcement of the
monetary-policy decision, at the conclusion of the meeting, instead of
waiting for quick minutes to be released two days later. In the announce-
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12. “The Bank of Japan will provide more ample funds and encourage the uncollateralized
overnight call rate to move as low as possible. To avoid excessive volatility in the short-term
ﬁnancial markets, the Bank of Japan will, by paying due consideration to maintaining mar-
ket function, initially aim to guide the above call rate to move around 0.15 percent, and sub-
sequently induce further decline in view of the market developments” (Bank of Japan, An-
nouncement of Decisions, February 12, 1999).
13. At the time of spring 1999, the growth rates of ﬁve quarters from 1997:IV through
1998:IV were estimated as negative. The current (spring of 2004) estimates for the same pe-
riod are 0.7, –1.0, –1.1, 0.8, and 0.1. The reasons for the diﬀerence are explained in note ten.
14. Some speculate that there was also implicit political pressure from the meeting between
the Finance Minister of Japan and the U.S. Treasury secretary on September 4.ment, the board emphasized that monetary policy would not respond to
exchange rate movements, that nonsterilized intervention was not a useful
policy, and that the press was greatly mistaken in its reports on what would
happen at the upcoming meeting. The board indicated that it had done
enough in easing monetary conditions, and it barely concealed the desire
to go back to the positive interest rate by emphasizing the side eﬀects of
ZIRP.
The board challenged the market expectation that nonsterilized inter-
vention was to be pursued. It took a position that the exchange rate was
one of the variables to be monitored, but monetary policy should not par-
ticularly respond to the exchange rate movement, per se.15 The board then
explained that nonsterilized intervention was not a useful concept for the
central bank that watches total funds in the market, whatever various
sources it came from.16 In addition, the board statement contained cau-
tionary comments on the side eﬀects of ZIRP, a forerunner to ending the
ZIRP eleven months later.17
The board expressed displeasure on press reports and market reaction in
strong words: “In the past few days, the market has substantially ﬂuctuated
by speculations on monetary policy. What should be clear is that the con-
duct of monetary policy is exclusively decided by majority vote at the
Monetary Policy Meeting, a regular meeting of the Policy Board. It is never
the case that our policy is determined in advance or in consultation with
outside bodies. We would like to emphasize this point” (Bank of Japan, “On
the Current Monetary Policy” 21 September 1999).
The quotes from the statement vividly illustrated the position of the
board. Any reporting of the expected decision was considered to be a chal-
lenge to independence. The board successfully extinguished any expecta-
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15. “The foreign exchange rate in itself is not a direct objective of monetary policy. One of
the precious lessons we learned from the experience of policy operations during the bubble
period is that, monetary policy operations linked with control of the foreign exchange rate
runs a risk of leading to erroneous policy decisions. Having said this, it does not mean that
monetary policy is pursued without any consideration to the development of the foreign ex-
change rate. The Bank considers it important to carefully monitor the development of the for-
eign exchange rate from the viewpoint of how it aﬀects the economy and prices” (Bank of
Japan, “On the Current Monetary Policy” September 21, 1999).
16. “In relation to the foreign exchange rate policy, we have heard arguments in favor of
nonsterilized intervention. In the reserve market, however, there are various ﬂows of funds
such as currency in circulation and Treasury funds other than those resulting from the inter-
vention. The Bank conducts its daily market operations taking into account all the money
ﬂows, in order to create ample reserves to such an extent as described above. This strong com-
mitment of fund provision is consistent with the government’s current foreign exchange rate
policy” (Bank of Japan, “On the Current Monetary Policy” September 21, 1999).
17. “The Bank views the current state of the Japanese economy as having stopped deterio-
rating with some bright signs, though a clear and sustainable recovery of private demand has
yet to be seen. In pursuing the zero interest rate policy, we need to carefully examine its ad-
verse side eﬀects, but deem it important to support the economic recovery by continuing easy
monetary policy for the periods ahead” (Bank of Japan, “On the Current Monetary Policy”
September 21, 1999).tion in the market that the bank would be accommodative in response to
desires from the government or the market. Any doubt about independ-
ence was erased on 21 September 1999. However, their own strong words
might have trapped the board members: that is, they could not change their
positions in the following months.
Between the fall of 1999 and the summer of 2000, there was no addi-
tional easing, except for liquidity injections to deal with Y2K concerns.
The government wanted some sort of additional measures of monetary
easing, while the governor increasingly mentioned the possibility of lifting
ZIRP. At this point, the bank explained that the bank would continue
ZIRP “until deﬂationary concerns subside.” The economy started to show
some signs of recovery in the spring of 2000, ICT-related stock prices went
up and the Nikkei 225 increased by 30 percent between March 1999 and
March 2000. Corporate proﬁts rose and corporate investment showed
signs of recovery. There was an argument that these corporate earnings
would trickle down to households to stimulate consumption sooner or
later.18 This argument was dubbed the “dam theory”: water was ﬁlling the
corporate dam and would overﬂow sooner or later. Governor Hayami, be-
lieving that this was communication with the market, frequently suggested
that there were bright signs in the economy and, as a consequence, there
would be a possibility of raising the interest rate. Critics thought it was pre-
mature to talk about lifting the interest rate, and any mention of it itself di-
minished the eﬀect of ZIRP by limiting its eﬀects through expectations that
easing would continue into the future.
The ZIRP was lifted in the policy board meeting of 11 August 2000.19At
this point, the continuation of a recovery of the Japanese economy was at
best doubtful. First, the ICT bubble had ended and stock prices in the
United States and Japan were heading down, suggesting investment and
consumption would be adversely aﬀected in the near future. Second, the
U.S. economy was beginning to show weakness, and Japanese exports to
the United States were expected to decline in the future. Third, the inﬂa-
tion rate was still negative, and there was no sign of an end to deﬂation.
Critics of the bank thought that ending ZIRP was a mistake. Indeed, the
government exercised an option, speciﬁed in the Bank of Japan Law, to put
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18. “Currently, it is our judgment that Japan’s economy is at the stage where the number of
ﬁrms taking the oﬀensive has started increasing, that is, the economy is moderately recover-
ing parallel with structural adjustment....   with respect to the recovery of private demand, it
seems natural that the corporate sector, which has regained proﬁtability as a result of re-
structuring, should take the lead by increasing investment followed by the household sector
as income conditions gradually improve. This is the development we are now witnessing”
(Speech given by Masaru Hayami, Governor of the BOJ, at the Japan Center for Economic Re-
search on May 29, 2000, available at [http://www.boj.or.jp/en/press/00/ko0005b.htm#0103]).
19. Governor Hayami intended to raise the interest rate in July. However, a large depart-
ment store, SOGO, failed and the economy showed some weakness. The plan of lifting the in-
terest rate was postponed without being submitted to the meeting.forward a motion for delaying voting of the proposal of raising the interest
rate until the next meeting. The government motion was overruled by the
board by an eight to one vote, and then the lifting of the zero interest rate
policy was decided by a seven to two decision.
Almost as soon as the interest rate was raised in August, the Japanese
economy entered into a recession. It was not known at the time, but the
oﬃcial date for the peak of the business cycle turned out to be October
2000. The growth rate of 2000:III turned negative, which was oﬀset to some
extent by a brief recovery in 2000:IV. But, as the economy turned into a re-
cession, the criticism of the BOJ’s actions became stronger.
The economy weakened substantially toward the end of 2000. Many
urged changes in monetary policy. Some economists had recommended
the return to ZIRP, and others recommended quantitative easing and un-
conventional monetary policy including increasing the amount of regular
purchases of long-term government bonds, and newly purchasing listed
mutual funds of stocks, foreign bonds, and even real estate funds. These
unconventional monetary tools had been rejected by Bank of Japan econ-
omists earlier.
As 2001 started, many indicators were showing weakness and the Bank
of Japan decided to ease. The question then was whether to go back to the
ZIRP or to introduce a new framework, quantitative easing. In February,
the bank introduced the so-called Lombard lending facility as well as cut-
ting the oﬃcial discount rate from 0.5 percent to 0.35 percent. The Lom-
bard lending facility was to lend automatically to banks with collateral at
the oﬃcial discount rate, so that the interest rate would be capped at 0.35
percent. However, the market rate was at around 0.2–0.25 percent, so there
was little real impact from the introduction of the Lombard facility. Pres-
sure to ease monetary conditions did not stop because of these measures in
February 2001.
The policy board meeting of 19 March 2001, turned out to be the begin-
ning of quantitative easing as well as further easing in terms of the interest
rate. The target inter-bank rate was lowered immediately to 0.15 percent,
and would go down to zero, as conditions warranted. The oﬃcial discount
rate was cut to 0.25 percent. However, the policy change was not announced
as just a return to ZIRP. It was billed as a change in the monetary policy in-
strument. The instrument was changed from the short-term interest rate to
the balance of current accounts at the BOJ. The target of the current ac-
count was set at 5 trillion yen. However, by targeting an amount beyond re-
quired reserves (about 4 trillion yen), it eﬀectively meant that the interbank
rate (i.e., the call rate) would go to zero. This amounted to excess reserve
targeting.20In September 2001, the oﬃcial discount rate was cut to 0.1 per-
cent, but this did not have any impact.
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20. Earlier than it was adopted in March 2001, BOJ economist, Okina (1999a) reviewed the
excess reserve targeting as a possibility of next step of further monetary easing. He pointedThe bank has also made clearer the conditions when it would lift ZIRP
in the future. When the BOJ adopted ZIRP for the ﬁrst time in February
1999, the condition for lifting ZIRP was when deﬂationary concerns were
dispelled. When the ZIRP was eﬀectively reintroduced in March 2001, the
condition became more concrete: excess reserve targeting, or de facto ZIRP,
would not be abandoned until the inﬂation rate, measured by CPI exclud-
ing fresh food, became stably above zero. The exit condition would be fur-
ther clariﬁed in October 2003, to be explained later.
From March 2001 to March 2003, quantitative easing was expanded in
several steps.
• In August 2001, another measure of quantitative easing was employed.
The amount of BOJ outright purchases of long-term government
bonds was raised from 400 billion yen per month to 600 billion yen per
month. At the same time, the current account target was raised to 6 tril-
lion yen (or about 2 trillion yen excess reserves).
• In December 2001, the monthly purchase of long-term bonds was in-
creased from 600 billion yen to 800 billion yen, the current account
target was raised to 10–15 trillion yen.
• In February 2002, the monthly purchase of long-term bonds was in-
creased from 800 billion yen to 1 trillion yen.
• In October 2002, the monthly purchase of long-term bonds was raised
to 1.2 trillion yen from 800 billion yen, and the current account target
was raised to 15–20 trillion yen.
There have been mixed reviews on these steps. Although these steps ex-
panded quantitative easing, especially in the amount of long-term bonds
from 400 billion yen per month in September 2001 to 1.2 trillion yen per
month in October 2002, deﬂation worsened. Some argue that this shows
that quantitative easing did not work. However, advocates of quantitative
easing would say that these actions prevented a major decline in economic
activities.
These measures are summarized in the ﬁgure 4.3. Panel A shows the ex-
pansion of purchase of long-term bonds and current account target, while
panel B shows the movements of the oﬃcial discount rate and the call rate.
4.3.2 Assessment of the Hayami Regime
In the initial stage (April 1998 to March 1999) of the Hayami regime, un-
til ZIRP was adopted, many BOJ oﬃcials expressed a negative view toward
further easing (zero interest rate and quantitative easing including base
money expansion, government bond, and equity purchases), indicating
that it was either ineﬀective or would have undesirable side eﬀects, includ-
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out a few problems with this option. First, “what kind of function can be expected of excess
reserves” is not known with certainty and it was identiﬁed as a problem. Second, excess re-
serves is not reliable “as an indicator for monetary easing.” Third, Okina points out an oper-
ational hurdle.ing the risk of high inﬂation.21 The call for easing by scholars was being re-
buﬀed. (See Krugman 1998, Meltzer 1998, McKinnon and Ohno 1997 for
the calls for monetary easing; and Okina 1999a, b for the rebuﬀ.) When
ZIRP was adopted in the spring of 1999, the bank maintained the view that
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Fig. 4.3 Quantitative easing and interest rate cut
A
B
21. One such cautious opinion was expressed in July 1999 by Kazuo Ueda, a former Uni-
versity of Tokyo professor, now a newly appointed policy board member.
“The policy to increase the money supply would ﬁrst create some decline in the call rate,
but automatically create further rate declines if the economy worsens and the demand for
money declines. In this sense the commitment to avoid deﬂationary forces is stronger with
money supply targeting....  T o  the extent that the money supply works through interest
rates, the commitment money supply targeting delivers is already contained in the current
policy stance....  T h e  a r gument that an increase in the growth rate of the money supply in-
creases inﬂationary expectations and stimulates aggregate demand by lowering real inter-
est rates sounds attractive. It is unclear again, however, how this mechanism works when
the nominal interest rate has been already driven down to zero....  H o w  a bout a policy of
letting the monetary base grow at 20 or 30 percent then? Inﬂation does not seem to be on
the horizon. One can tighten after the inﬂation rate reaches 1 or 2 percent. We think such
a policy would have a small chance of success for reasons already mentioned. When it doesno further steps were needed. The bank strongly resented any pressure or
even suggestion from outside on further easing, as shown in the episode of
their complaining about the speculation of easing before the meeting in
September 1999. In the spring of 2000, Governor Hayami started to sug-
gest ending ZIRP. Most likely, he wanted to communicate with the market
on the bank’s future intentions, in order to avoid a “surprise” reaction of
the market and resulting volatility in the money and capital market. How-
ever, this suggestion certainly diminished any beneﬁcial eﬀects of ZIRP be-
cause it created expectations of higher interest rates in the future. The in-
terest rate was raised in August 2000 despite the opinions by many scholars
and the government of the need for further easing. In an international con-
ference sponsored by the BOJ in July 2000, many scholars and foreign par-
ticipants were critical of the past and current policy of the BOJ: Meltzer
(2001), Goodfriend (2001), and Svensson (2001)—note the publication
date of these papers was in 2001, but the conference took place in July
2000, one month before the ZIRP was reversed. Oda and Okina (2001)
compare various policy options of monetary easing and their associated
risks. The authors emphasized the risks more than the beneﬁts of policy
options proposed to the BOJ by “academics.” They argued that “introduc-
tion of a temporary ﬁxed exchange rate system and a huge increase in the
outright purchase of medium- and long-term government bonds can in-
duce relatively large eﬀects, although the uncertainty in the eﬀects as well
as the accompanied costs and risks may be very large.” One of the discus-
sants, Jack Beebe (2001), felt that the “authors’ views of policy feasibility
and risks are unduly pessimistic....  T h u s ,  the risks inherent in taking fur-
ther policy actions need to be balanced against the risks of not taking
them.” What is striking is that the conference at which this debate took
place occurred one month before the interest rate hike when ZIRP was ex-
ited, which we view was a clear policy mistake.
When the ZIRP returned with quantitative easing (current account bal-
ance of 5 trillion yen implying the excess reserve of 1 trillion yen) in March
2001, the bank did not explain why the change in policy would be eﬀective,
and this was particularly important because the bank had not been posi-
tive on its eﬀectiveness in the past. In the summer to fall of 2001, there were
calls for further easing by raising the current account target increase, in-
creasing bond purchases, and purchasing equities and foreign bonds. Bank
economists were negative on these suggested actions, saying that it was im-
possible to raise the current balance target (no buyers of short-term paper
with zero interest rates), or no eﬀect beyond stabilizing the ﬁnancial sys-
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succeed, it will probably generate a much higher rate of inﬂation than 1 or 2 percent. Be-
cause of lags in the eﬀects of policy, the 20–30 percent money growth will continue to gen-
erate inﬂationary pressure even after the tightening starts” (Kazuo Ueda, Member of the
Policy Board of the Bank of Japan, at the Meeting on Economic and Financial Matters in
Kagoshima, on July 1, 1999, available at [http://www.boj.or.jp/en/press/99/ko9907a.htm]).tem, and that risk of possible deterioration of balance sheets would be se-
rious.22 The policy started to change in December 2001, when the current
account target was raised and long-bond purchases were raised in several
steps. What was branded impossible was now possible, and the concern
about the balance sheet, emphasized earlier by the bank itself, was buried
without addressing it formally.
In September 2002, the bank started to purchase equities that the com-
mercial banks held but wanted to dispose of in light of declining stock
prices. Earlier, the bank had denied any possibility of purchasing stocks.23
The action was justiﬁed by the bank on the ground that it would reduce the
risk of commercial banks’ balance sheets, and it was made clear that it was
not intended as monetary policy, but rather as ﬁnancial-market stabiliza-
tion policy. (The decision was not made by the monetary policy board
meeting—equivalent of Federal Open Market Committee—but the regu-
lar board meeting.) However, it was not explained why the resulting risk to
the BOJ balance sheet due to ﬁnancial-stabilization policy was not a big
concern, while it was for monetary policy.
In October 2000, the bank paper “On Price Stability” emphasized that
it would be diﬃcult to focus on a particular price index as a guide to pol-
icy. Earlier, the bank was quite negative on the idea of inﬂation targeting.
However, in March 2001, the board decided to adopt the ZIRP plus quan-
titative easing until the CPI excluding fresh food showed a positive inﬂa-
tion rate “stably above zero.” This seemed to be a welcome switch from neg-
ative to a positive attitude toward selecting a price index and targeting a
150 Takatoshi Ito and Frederic S. Mishkin
22. “Three options for further monetary easing can be considered when money market in-
terest rates are near zero....  T h i r d ,  the BOJ can carry out unconventional operations by pur-
chasing assets other than short-term Japanese government securities....  T h e  third policy op-
tion is for a central bank to purchase non-traditional assets such as government bonds,
foreign currencies, corporate bonds, stocks, or real estate which are more imperfectly substi-
tutable for base money than are short-term government securities. As stated above, central
bank operations that amount to the exchange of perfect substitutes produce little eﬀect on 
the economy. Such non-traditional operations are eﬀective because they directly alter the
prices of the assets in question. Possible beneﬁts and costs of this monetary policy option,
however, are extremely uncertain” (Kazuo Ueda, Member of the Policy Board, at the semi-
annual meeting of the Japan Society of Monetary Economics held at Fukushima University
in Fukushima City on September 29, 2001, available at [http://www.boj.or.jp/en/press/01/
ko0112a.htm#0301]).
23. Governor Hayami denied the possibility of purchasing stocks as early as 1998, and re-
peatedly opposed to this saying that it violates the law. “There is intrinsically a very strict limit
as to the extent to which a central bank can take on private sector risk. By shouldering such
risk and seeing a subsequent deterioration in our assets, we might lose the conﬁdence placed
in us to fulﬁll our fundamental mission. Hence, the new Bank of Japan Law (eﬀective April
1998) prohibits the Bank from purchasing equities bearing large credit and price risks. We
thus do not think it appropriate to purchase corporate debt and equity” (A summary of the
speech given by Masaru Hayami Governor, the Bank of Japan to the Kisaragi-kai meeting in
Tokyo on December 22, 1998) [http://www.boj.or.jp/en/press/98/ko9812a.htm]). The switch in
fall of 2002, why the governor changed the opinion and the purchase became possible with-
out changing the law, was not explained.numerical number, but the switch was not explained. In sum, the bank has
been changing its position and action, but the switch was not explained
well, and contributed to the decline in the credibility of the bank.
4.3.3 Fukui Regime
The new Governor Toshihiko Fukui took over the leadership of the
Bank of Japan at the maturity of the ﬁve-year term of Governor Hayami in
March 2003. Two deputy governors were also replaced. One of the two new
deputy governors is Mr. Toshiro Muto who was earlier vice minister of ﬁ-
nance; and the other Dr. Kazumasa Iwata, a former professor of econom-
ics. Iwata has been known to favor inﬂation targeting.
The new team moved quickly to increase the current account balance at
the BOJ. The target amount was raised from 15–20 trillion yen, at the time
of March 2003 to 30–35 trillion yen as of January 2004. The amount of
long-term bond purchases was not changed.
The biggest change has been the rhetoric. Governor Fukui has made it
explicit that the bank should maintain ZIRP until the inﬂation rate was
clearly above zero. He seems to indicate commitment of ZIRP into the fu-
ture, a sort of commitment recommended by inﬂation target advocates, or
even better.24
Although the new policy is a big improvement over the last regime, there
was some room for improvement. The tolerance of inﬂation was not indi-
cated with precise numbers. Therefore, it was less credible than otherwise.
One answer to such a criticism is the policy announcement of October
2003. It laid out the conditions for raising the interest rate:
First, it requires not only that the most recently published core CPI
should register a zero percent or above, but also that such tendency
should be conﬁrmed over a few months.
Second, the bank needs to be convinced that the prospective core CPI
will not be expected to register below a zero percent. This point will be
described in such materials as the analysis and the forecasts of policy
board members in the Outlook Report. To be more speciﬁc, many pol-
icy board members need to make the forecasts that the core CPI will reg-
ister above a zero percent during the forecasting period.
The above conditions are the necessary condition. There may be
cases, however, that the bank will judge it appropriate to continue with
quantitative easing even if these two conditions are fulﬁlled. (Bank of
Japan, monetary policy committee announcement, 13 October 2003)
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24. In his speech to economists, Fukui (2003) tried to put a spin that the exit-from-ZIRP
condition that the Bank had adopted was more tolerant to inﬂation than a usual inﬂation tar-
get: “Assuming that a target has been established (for example, at 2 percent), if the expected
inﬂation rate rises above the target and the Bank does not start tightening at that early stage,
the actual inﬂation rate is likely to go beyond the target. Since the Bank’s current policy com-
mitments do not assume such a tightening at an early stage, they actually run a risk in the di-
rection of greater inﬂation than in the case of standard inﬂation targeting.”Despite the good performance in the GDP growth rate in 2003:IV, the ﬁ-
nancial and capital market participants expect that ZIRP will continue for
a long time. This is a big change from the Hayami regime. So far, credibil-
ity of the BOJ to maintain ZIRP seems to be on the rise.
The recent history of Japanese monetary policy has created two basic
problems for the Japanese monetary authorities today. First, the BOJ’s
policies have left Japan in a prolonged deﬂationary environment in which
conventional monetary policy through lowering the short-term interest rate
is no longer eﬀective because the policy rate has hit a ﬂoor of zero. Second,
past Japanese monetary policy, particularly under the Hayami regime, has
left the bank of Japan with a severe credibility problem in which the mar-
kets and the public are unconvinced that Japanese monetary policy can be
committed to future expansion that would return the economy to health.
Both of these problems present the bank with particular challenges in get-
ting the economy out of deﬂation quickly, a subject we will return to later
in the chapter.
4.4 Why Taylor Rules Are Not the Way 
to Assess Japanese Monetary Policy
In assessing the conduct of Japanese monetary policy over the last
twenty years, the following questions arise:
1. Whether the BOJ should/could have taken stronger actions against
the genesis of the bubble?
2. Whether the BOJ should/could have eased earlier in the 1992–1998
period in the aftermath of the burst bubble, in order to prevent the econ-
omy falling into deﬂation?
3. Whether the BOJ should/could have adopted the zero interest rate
policy earlier than February/March 1999 in its ﬁght against deﬂation (as a
prevention or as a cure)?
4. Whether it was a mistake to raise the interest rate amid deﬂation in
August 2000?
5. Whether the bank could have pursued nonconventional policy, be-
yond what was actually implemented in 2001–2003 to prevent a deﬂation-
ary spiral (self-fulﬁlling expectation) from settling in?
The Taylor rule has been a popular tool to assess the monetary-policy
stance. The nominal interest rate is regressed on the GDP gap and the de-
viation of the inﬂation rate from the target inﬂation rate, along with the
constant term that represents the long-run equilibrium real interest rate
and the target inﬂation rate. The Taylor rule might make it possible to judge
whether the monetary policy was too tight or too loose for a particular pe-
riod assuming that the estimated coeﬃcients—either for an entire sample
period or a part of it or, in some cases, from other countries—represent a
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(ﬁtted value) target interest rate is interpreted for too tight or too loose
monetary policy. The simplest version of the Taylor rule regression is as fol-
lows:
(1) it   rf    ∗    y   yt        ( t    ∗),
where it is the policy nominal interest rate; rf is long-term equilibrium in-
terest rate;  ∗ is the target inﬂation rate;  t is the inﬂation rate; and yt is the
GDP gap (the log diﬀerence of the GDP and the potential GDP). In short,
the nominal interest rate is regressed on the constant term, the GDP gap,
and the inﬂation deviation, and in some cases the asset prices or the ex-
change rate. When equation (1) is regressed for a period in which the cen-
tral bank has been operated under a stable regime, then the equation with
estimated coeﬃcients is viewed as a “reaction function” of a central bank.
Then, the ﬁtted value of the left-hand side variable is considered to be
target interest rate (normal interest rate) that the central bank on average
would have pursued if the reaction function was followed without a devia-
tion. If the average is interpreted as optimal, then the Taylor equation gives
the normative content. When the actual interest rate is below the target
policy rate (the ﬁtted value) at period t, then the monetary policy is judged
to be more relaxed, compared to other periods. Then monetary policy that
is more relaxed is judged as too lax. Similarly, when the actual interest rate
is above the target rate at period t, then monetary policy at tis judged to be
too tight.
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) showed that monetary policy was too lax
in 1989–1990, and too tight from 1992 to 1996. Okina and Shiratsuka
(2002) criticized Bernanke and Gertler (1999) that their recommendations
of early tightening in the mid 1980s to prevent asset inﬂation were imprac-
tical. Okina and Shiratsuka think that the forward-looking inﬂation rate
(with rational-expectation assumption) is a source of problem.
Okina and Shiratsuka (2002, 2004) and Okina, Shirakawa, and Shirat-
suka (2001) have examined monetary policy from the mid-1980s to 2002
and explored several policy options. They tend to show that monetary pol-
icy in the mid-1980s was a mistake in the sense the bubble was formed, but
monetary policy in the mid- to late-1990s was basically right, and monetary
policy after ZIRP does not have policy options.
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) quantiﬁed the eﬀects of the zero
bound on macroeconomic stabilization capability. They argue that under a
severe contraction, open market operations alone may be insuﬃcient to re-
store equilibrium. The Taylor rule should be modiﬁed to take into account
the zero bound.
Harrigan and Kuttner (2004) applied the coeﬃcients from the United
States, simulated the path of the interest rate, and came to a conclusion:
Had the overnight rate been set according to the Fed’s policy rule, it would
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through 1995.
Indeed, learning lessons from the Japanese situations was a popular ex-
ercise in the United States with an intention to avoid deﬂation. Clouse, et
al. (2000) went through a menu of options that the central bank can think
of adopting at the zero interest rate, and Ahearne et al. (2002) critically
evaluated the BOJ policy. The latter came down to a conclusion that the
Japanese monetary policy was too tight from 1992 to 1995. Bernanke and
Gertler (1999); Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000); McCallum (2003); and
Taylor (2001) all obtained a similar conclusion that monetary loosening af-
ter 1992 was too slow (with varying changes of degree and period).
Kamada (2004) shows various estimates depending on various assump-
tions on output gap and data availability for decision making. Most of the
simulated results show that the target rate in 2000 remained negative, sug-
gesting that lifting ZIRP in August 2000 was a mistake, although he re-
frains from such an interpretation.
Clearly, researchers have come to quite diﬀerent conclusions using esti-
mates of Taylor rules. Can this evidence be considered to be reliable? We
have our doubts. To illustrate this we estimate a regular Taylor equation to
examine the crucial assumptions and consequences. The following is the
basic data deﬁnitions: the interest rate is the call rate (collateralized call
rate until June 1985, and uncollateralized call rate after that month); the
price index is either the CPI excluding fresh food or the GDP deﬂator, mea-
sured as the change over the same month/quarter of previous year.
First, the GDP gap is estimated with an assumption that the potential
GDP grows with a growth rate of moving average of the past growth rates
in the sample. The potential output is further adjusted partly with the ac-
tual output with weight of 0.9 to long-run potential output and 0.1 to the
output level of t – 1:
(2) Yt ∗(1   gt 1)   exp[  ln Y∗
t 1   (1    )   ln Y t 1],
where Y t–1 is the real GDP of t–1,  is a set parameter of partial adjustment
and here set to be 0.9, and gt–1 is deﬁned as




Although this is an ad hoc way to deﬁne potential output, it does capture
a gradual decline in potential output in the 1990s without imposing perfect
foresight or perfect hindsight, and allowing for the possibility that the
1990s were always below potential (lost decade) rather than imposing a re-
striction that some years have to be above potential. As McCallum (2003)
pointed out, using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter or a curve ﬁtting method
implies that some years have to be above potential and not appropriate in
the situation that the last set of observations are suspected as being below
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The target inﬂation rate is assumed to be 2 percent. The target long-term
real interest rate is implied from the estimated constant term, namely, the
estimated constant term less 2 percent. In order to examine what the target
rate should have been for a Taylor rule ignoring the zero bound, we esti-
mate the equations using the data from 1982:I to 1994:IV.
Table 4.1 is the result of this estimation. The upper panel is the set of es-
timations with backward-looking models, while the lower panel is the set
of estimations with forward-looking models. For the price index, the GDP
deﬂator, CPI, and CPI excluding fresh food, are used. The GDP gap is not
signiﬁcant in the forward-looking regressions.
Figure 4.5 shows the target rate (depending on the forward and back-
ward inﬂation rate) compared to the actual rate. The graph shows the fol-
lowing property. According to the graph, with an interpretation of the tar-
get interest rate (with backward inﬂation rate) to be a desirable rate, it can
be said that the monetary policy was too loose from 1988–89; just about
right from 1992–1995; and too loose (!) in 1996–97. However, after 1999,
that target interest rate is negative, suggesting that the zero interest rate
policy should be maintained. The Taylor rule estimates suggest lifting of
the zero interest rate toward the end of 2000, although very brieﬂy and very
slightly above zero.25 For the reasons we outlined in the previous section,
we are doubtful about this conclusion.
Figure 4.5A, the forward-looking model, shows that the “target rate”
has been consistently above the actual rate since 1995, either with the GDP
deﬁnition or with the CPI deﬁnition. We again are suspicious of this result.
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Fig. 4.4 GDP gap
25. Ueda (2000) cited an internal study of the Taylor rule in his argument for arguing
against lifting the zero interest rate policy. See the next footnote for detailed quotes.The forward-looking model did not have a signiﬁcant estimate of the
GDP gap.
Figure 4.5B, the backward-looking model, shows that the GDP deﬂator
model has had a negative target rate since 1998. However, it shows a posi-
tive target rate during the 1997–1998 period. The CPI model shows that the
target rate has become positive since 2002. Both of these results are coun-
terintuitive.
The above results suggest that we should be quite skeptical of estimated
Taylor rules as a measure of optimal monetary-policy stance. This does not
surprise us because there are theoretical reasons for doubting the useful-
ness of Taylor rules to assess monetary policy, many of which have been
outlined by Kuttner and Posen (2004). First, the Taylor rule is essentially a
reaction function, and not an optimality condition. Unless the average
monetary reaction for the period of estimation is a priori known as the best
practice, one cannot interpret it as the optimum, and any deviation cannot
be evidence of too tight or too loose. Second, estimates are often quite
sensitive to the estimation period, and that is not reassuring for us to use
any particular regression results conﬁdently without checking robustness.
Third, the output gap, an important component of the Taylor rule equa-
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Table 4.1 Taylor Rule model in Japan (1982:1–1994:4)
Inﬂation rate gap





GDP deﬂator or CPI ex fresh food 1.468*** 1.752***
(0.090) (0.133)







GDP deﬂator or CPI ex fresh food 1.233*** 1.706***
(0.110) (0.276)




Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskadastic-consistent.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level.tion, is diﬃcult to estimate. Fitting a linear trend or more sophisticated
curve (e.g., HP ﬁlter) is unlikely to give us a correct output gap if years near
the end of the sample are unusual (either in the upward or downward di-
rection). For example, during the late 1990s, any conventional measure of
GDP gap (or not-accelerating-inﬂation-rate unemployment [NAIRU]) in
the United States was indicating an overheating that would require mone-
tary tightening. However, in view of strong productivity increase, later
known as a new economy, the Federal Reserve did not tighten monetary
policy, and strong economic growth was extended without inﬂation until
2000. This episode shows the diﬃculty in estimating mechanically the out-
put gap. Fourth, there are some deep conceptual problems in even deciding
what an appropriate measure of the output gap is. Fifth, the regular Taylor-
rule estimation does not assume that the nominal interest rate is bounded
at zero. Therefore, in the case of Japan, the target rate estimated from the
Taylor rule, without imposing the zero bound, often shows that the rate
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B
Fig. 4.5 Actual versus target rate: A, backward-looking model; B, forward-
looking modelshould be negative—this is regarded as evidence for keeping the rate at
zero, as illustrated above.26 However, this is not rigorous. If the Taylor rule
is to be interpreted as an optimal monetary policy, the zero constraint of the
nominal interest rate should be included in the estimation itself. Policy ad-
vice that the interest rate should be lowered more quickly than when the in-
ﬂation rate is very low cannot be obtained from a regular Taylor equation
that does not impose the zero bound condition.
Our examination of the Taylor-rule exercise above leaves us with a skep-
tical view of the use of this model to assess Japanese monetary policy. An
alternative approach that we ﬁnd very attractive is that in Kuttner and
Posen (2004), which looks for deﬂation scares—sharp declines in long-
term bond prices when there was no increase in the short-term policy rates.
Indeed, Kuttner and Posen (2004) come to a similar view of the Hayami
regime. Monetary policy during that period weakened the credibility of the
BOJ to overcome the deﬂationary environment, and the abandonment of
ZIRP in August 2000 was a clear policy mistake that led to entrenched ex-
pectations of continuing deﬂation.
4.5 How Costly is Deﬂation?
We have seen that Japan’s deﬂation has been accompanied by weakness
in the economy. However, does this mean that deﬂation has been harmful in
Japan? Furthermore, even if deﬂation has had serious negative conse-
quences for Japan, does that mean that deﬂation is always costly? When is a
deﬂation likely to be harmful and thus to be avoided, and when not? There
are several potential costs to deﬂation and we look at each of these in turn.
4.5.1 Deﬂation and the Labor Market
One argument for a high cost to deﬂation is found in the work of Akerlof,
Dickens, and Perry (1996). Inﬂation that is at too low a level (which for
them is below 2 percent) produces ineﬃciency and will result in an increase
in the natural rate of unemployment. They argue that downward rigidity of
nominal wages, which they argue is consistent with the evidence, indicates
that reductions of real wages can occur only through inﬂation. The impli-
cation is that a very low rate of inﬂation might prevent real wages from ad-
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26. An interpretation of negative target rate under the Taylor rule as a suggestion for keep-
ing the zero interest rate policy in Japan has been mentioned in Ueda (September 22, 2000)
who had voted against lifting ZIRP a month earlier: “the [output] gap is larger, on the deﬂa-
tionary side, by about 4 percent than the neutral level. With a coeﬃcient of 50 percent on the
gap in the Taylor rule formula, the gap term already contributes –2 percent to the interest rate.
The inﬂation term also contributes negatively . . . Thus, there is no chance for the Taylor rule
rate to become positive under such assumptions.” A similar view was expressed by “one mem-
ber” in the Monetary Policy Board meeting that reinstated ZIRP on March 19, 2001: “This
member said that, according to this member’s simulation applying the Taylor rule, when the
economy recovered in the future, termination of the policy when the inﬂation rate was slightly
above zero percent would not be premature.”justing downward in response to declining labor demand in certain indus-
tries or regions, thereby leading to increased unemployment and hindering
the reallocation of labor from declining sectors to expanding sectors.
The evidence for the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry mechanism through which
low inﬂation raises the natural rate of unemployment is not at all clear-cut
(e.g., Lebow, Stockton, and Wascher 1995; Card and Hyslop 1997; Lebow,
Saks, and Wilson 1999; Crawford and Harrison 2000; and Fares and Le-
mieux 2000). Also as pointed out by Groshen and Schweitzer (1996, 1999),
inﬂation can not only put “grease” in the labor markets and allow down-
ward shifts in real wages in response to a decline in demand along the lines
of Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry (1996), but it can also put in “sand” by in-
creasing the noise in relative real wages. This noise reduces the information
content of nominal wages and hence the eﬃciency of the process by which
workers are allocated across occupations and industries. Thus, we do have
some skepticism about the Akerlof-Dickens-Perry (1996) argument which
argues for keeping the inﬂation rate above 2 percent. However, their work
does suggest that deﬂation might be costly.
In Japan, downward rigidity of annual compensation may not be large
since regular, full-time workers have several months of compensations in
bonuses. The bonuses are known to be more ﬂexible, reﬂecting the perfor-
mance of companies as well as individuals. Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a,
b) argued that the impact wage rigidity has on unemployment is quite small
in Japan, at least among regular male workers. Wage rigidity was found to
be more prominent among hourly-wage, part-time female employees.
Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003c) conducted a simulation analysis to show
that the downward rigidity would raise the unemployment rate by as much
as 1.8 percentage points under the baseline parameters. The downward
wage rigidity aﬀects the labor-market condition most for the inﬂation rates
between 2.4 percent and 1 percent.
Whether due to the wage rigidity or to some other reasons, the unem-
ployment rate became as high as 5.5 percent in August 2002, compared to 4
percent in April 1998. It appears that the Phillips curve in Japan is sharply
kinked at around the zero percent, CPI inﬂation rate.
4.5.2 Deﬂation, Wealth Redistribution, and Financial Instability
Unexpected deﬂation has the eﬀect of shifting resources from borrowers
to lenders when there are long-term debt contracts with ﬁxed nominal in-
terest rates. With a lower price level, and debt ﬁxed in nominal terms, the
real burden of this debt necessarily increases. One might think that losses
by borrowers would be oﬀset by gains to lenders in the macro sense, since
unexpected deﬂation is just a wealth transfer, or a zero-sum result. But, this
is not the case because deﬂation can lead to ﬁnancial instability which can
impose large costs on the economy. This provides an even more compelling
reason to worry about deﬂation.
The transfer of resources from debtors as a result of deﬂation means that
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Irving Fisher (1933) aptly named this phenomenon “debt deﬂation” and
saw it as a major factor promoting the economic downturn during the
Great Depression.27With less net worth, there is a decline in the amount of
collateral a lender can grab if the borrower’s investments turn sour, and the
reduction in collateral therefore increases the consequences of adverse se-
lection because, in the case of a default, losses from loans are likely to be
more severe. In addition, the decline in net worth increases moral hazard
incentives for borrowers to take on excessive risk because they now have
less to lose if their investments go sour. The increase in moral hazard and
adverse selection from deﬂation then means that the ﬁnancial system mar-
kets will no longer be as capable of allocating capital to productive uses,
with the result that investment will decline and the economy will contract.
Wealth transfers are thus not neutral because they interfere with the eﬀec-
tive functioning of the capital markets. The Great Depression is an ex-
ample of when deﬂation had very negative consequences for the economy
(Bernanke 1983; Mishkin 1978, 1991, 1997), with a recent example being
that of Japan (Mishkin 1998).
Wealth redistribution from deﬂation also aﬀects the ﬁscal position of the
government. One of the largest borrowers with ﬁxed interest rate is the
Japanese government. The Japanese government has been regularly issu-
ing long-term government bonds with ﬁxed exchange rate. (Only in 2003,
did the Japanese government start to issue inﬂation-indexed bonds, but the
principal is protected from deﬂation.) Unexpected deﬂation during the
1990s meant that the Japanese government had an increased debt burden
in real terms. In addition, since tax brackets are not adjusted for inﬂation,
deﬂation meant that the government had less tax revenues (i.e., it suﬀered
a reverse bracket creep).
4.5.3 Deﬂation, the Zero Bound for Nominal Interest Rates, and
Increasing Diﬃculties in Conducting Monetary Policy
When the economy falls into deﬂation, as it has in Japan recently and as
occurred in the Great Depression in the 1930s in the United States, there is
a problem that arises from the zero bound of nominal interest rate. Lenders
will not accept a negative interest rate, since hoarding cash provides a
higher return. Thus nominal interest rates cannot go below a ﬂoor of zero
and this can throw the economy into a disequilibrium situation.
Suppose that the economy is extremely weak and the real interest rate
should be very low, possibly even zero or negative, in order to stimulate a
recovery. However, when deﬂation is under way so that expected deﬂation
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27. One might think that when both general price levels (for example, CPI) and asset-price
levels decrease, the ratio of asset prices to CPI may not drop as much, and the debt deﬂation
may not be so acute. However, the decrease in asset prices in Japan far exceeded CPI changes,
so debt deﬂation was a real problem.is substantial, a nominal interest rate that has hit the ﬂoor at zero leaves the
real interest rate quite positive. Because of the zero bound, monetary pol-
icy is no longer able to get the real interest rate down to the equilibrium real
rate that will put the economy back on track. The economy can be de-
scribed as being in a “deﬂation trap” in which it operates below capacity
with investment discouraged due to the deﬂationary environment.
Summers (1991) and a board member of the BOJ (Ueda 1999) have ar-
gued that in this situation, monetary policy becomes ineﬀective.28 How-
ever, we believe this argument is a fallacy for the reasons outlined in
Meltzer (1995) and in Mishkin (1996), and we discuss this further below.
Monetary policy works through many other asset prices besides those of
short-term debt securities, and so even when short-term interest rates hit
the ﬂoor of zero, monetary policy can still be eﬀective, and indeed was so
during the Great Depression (see, Romer 1992).
Nonetheless, monetary policy becomes more diﬃcult during deﬂation-
ary episodes when interest rates hit a ﬂoor of zero because the usual guides
to the conduct of monetary policy are no longer relevant. In recent years,
much of the research on how central banks should optimally conduct mon-
etary policy focus on so-called Taylor rules, in which the central bank sets
the short-term interest rates at a level which depends on both output and
inﬂation gaps. The Taylor (1999) volume is an excellent example of this
type of research. However, once the interest rate hits a ﬂoor of zero, all of
the research on optimal monetary-policy rules represented by work of the
type in the Taylor (1999) volume is no longer useful because manipulating
short-term interest rates is no longer an eﬀective tool of monetary policy,
as explained in an earlier section. We will see below that monetary policy
can still be eﬀective in stimulating the economy, but central bankers now
will ﬁnd themselves at sea without the usual knowledge to guide them,
making it harder for them to get monetary policy exactly right.
4.5.4 Productivity-Driven Deﬂation
There may be one type of deﬂation that is not necessarily harmful to the
economy: when the deﬂation occurs as a result of an extremely favorable
productivity shock. In this case, the debt-deﬂation phenomenon may not
operate. Think of what happens to a ﬁrm which ﬁnds the prices of the
goods it produces falling because of a favorable productivity shock. It is
true that the real indebtedness of the ﬁrm in terms of the ﬁrm’s good prices
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28. “Now let me brieﬂy touch upon an academic, not a real-world, question of what a cen-
tral bank can do beyond zero rates if it ever wanted to ease from that point on. . . . discussing
money supply eﬀects on the economy other than through interest rates. I must say they are
very small once liquidity has been injected enough to maintain the zero rate....  I  hasten to
add that, once the zero rate is reached and spreads over to most of the short-term interest
rates, attempts to expand the money supply themselves may become unsuccessful. We have
been experiencing this lately in Japan” Ueda (1999).rises. However, the value of the real value of the assets will also rise by the
same proportion, because the ﬁrm has become more productive. In this
case, the deﬂation is not leading to a decline in net worth and thus does not
lead to the negative consequences we described earlier. This may explain
the results in Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), who ﬁnd that deﬂation was only
clearly associated with economic depressions during the 1930s. Indeed, we
have seen a recent episode of deﬂation which does not appear to have had
negative consequences for the economy, China from 1997–2003.
Also, deﬂation that results from favorable supply shocks may not create
a problem for the conduct of monetary policy. Favorable supply shocks are
likely to increase the productivity of capital and thus raise the natural real
rate of interest. Thus, even with deﬂation, the zero lower bound for inter-
est rates will not be binding and monetary policy can be conducted using
the conventional interest-rate tools.
Deﬂation (or disinﬂation) due to productivity increases would be accom-
panied by faster growth of output. This is likely to be what happened in the
United States in the second half of the 1990s with the advent of the new
economy. However, deﬂation driven by productivity growth does not de-
scribe the situation in Japan where stagnation has accompanied deﬂation.29
4.5.5 Bottom Line on the Costs of Deﬂation
The conclusion here is that deﬂation that occurs as a result of a decline
in aggregate demand is likely to be harmful, both because it interferes with
the eﬃcient functioning of the ﬁnancial markets, but also because it makes
monetary policy harder to conduct. This is exactly the situation which
Japan has been experiencing recently and which the world faced during the
Great Depression period of the 1930s. This provides an important ration-
ale for being concerned about the possibility of deﬂation. However, deﬂa-
tion which results from favorable supply shocks may not be nearly as harm-
ful to the economy.
4.6 Deﬂation Prevention
The experience in Japan as well as the analysis in the previous section
suggests that deﬂation can be a serious problem with high costs to the
economy, particularly when it leads to a deﬂation trap in which conven-
tional monetary policy is unable to help the economy to recover. Here we
examine the question of how can monetary policy be designed to prevent
deﬂation and a deﬂation trap from occurring. We wait until the next section
to explore what can be done to get out of a deﬂation trap once it occurs.
Clearly, as Ahearne, et al. (2002) have pointed out, one way to prevent
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29. Repeated reference to “supply-side factors” and “technological innovations” in
Hayami’s speeches in the early years was quite puzzling to say the least.deﬂation is for monetary policy to respond particularly aggressively when
negative shocks hit the economy if the economy is already in a low inﬂation
environment. Indeed, our discussion of the Japanese experience earlier in
the chapter has shown that the BOJ did not do this and was continually be-
hind the curve in easing monetary policy when deﬂationary shocks ﬁrst hit
the economy. At one point, the BOJ even raised the interest rate amid de-
ﬂation. Clearly, central bankers are human and do make mistakes, but can
monetary policy be designed so that deﬂation and deﬂation traps are less
likely?
Here we will see that putting in place a strong nominal anchor through
an inﬂation targeting regime is an important strategy for reducing the
probability that deﬂation will occur. However, a key issue for such an in-
ﬂation targeting regime is what is the optimal level of inﬂation for the tar-
get? Once we examine this issue, we go on to look at whether or not it would
be better to have the inﬂation targeting regime shoot for an inﬂation target
or a price level target.
4.6.1 Inﬂation Targeting
As discussed and outlined in Mishkin (1999a), an inﬂation targeting
regime involves ﬁve elements: (a) public announcement of medium-term
numerical targets for the price-level path or inﬂation;30 (b) an institutional
commitment to price stability as the primary, long-run goal of monetary
policy and to achievement of the price stability goal; (c) an information in-
clusive strategy, with a reduced role for intermediate targets, such as money
growth; (d) increased transparency of the monetary-policy strategy
through communication with the public and the markets about the plans
and objectives of monetary policymakers; and (e) increased accountability
of the central bank for attaining its inﬂation objectives.
Two features of an inﬂation-targeting regime can help in the prevention
of deﬂation. The fact that a central bank that announces an inﬂation tar-
get and is accountable for achieving this target means that it will be under
greater pressure to take steps to avoid a deﬂation as long as the inﬂation
target is not too low (something that we turn to shortly).
For example, consider what might have happened if the BOJ had an in-
ﬂation target of 2 percent for the CPI (the median for inﬂation-targeting
regimes) in 1992 when the CPI inﬂation rate was still above 2 percent.
Would that have helped the BOJ guide its policy in prevention of deﬂation?
Or, suppose that the BOJ was given a 2 percent inﬂation target, in contrast
to the actual 0.3 percent inﬂation rate, as well as instrument independence
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30. To date all inﬂation targeters have chosen to target an inﬂation rate rather than the price
level. However, logically an inﬂation targeter could just as easily choose to target the path for
the price level, which trends upward at a chosen inﬂation rate as it targets a particular rate of
inﬂation itself. The only diﬀerence is whether by-gones are allowed to be by-gones. We look
at the question of the desirability of price level versus an inﬂation target later.in 1998 under the new BOJ law. Would that have made the BOJ introduce
the zero interest rate policy earlier than March 1999 and avoided lifting it
in August 2000?
The inﬂation numbers that came in after adoption of inﬂation targeting
would have indicated that the BOJ was not meeting its goals and pressure
on the BOJ to pursue more expansionary monetary policy would have
clearly increased. The likelihood that the BOJ would have lowered interest
rates more rapidly and started the zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) earlier
than 1999 would have been high. Furthermore, it is almost inconceivable
that the BOJ would have abandoned ZIRP and raised the policy interest
rate in August 2000 if an inﬂation-targeting regime of this type had been in
place, since it was absolutely clear at the time that deﬂation was ongoing
and a 2 percent inﬂation rate was nowhere in sight. An inﬂation-targeting
regime is thus likely to have prevented BOJ’s mistakes after 1998 and mon-
etary policy would have moved in the right direction far earlier. Although
this counterfactual does not imply that deﬂation would have been avoided,
the simulations in Ahearne et al. (2002) suggest that easing monetary pol-
icy earlier and not tightening in 2000 would have promoted a stronger
economy and reduced the degree of deﬂation. If an inﬂation-targeting
regime and operational independence of the BOJ had been in place after
the bubble economy burst, there is even a possibility that deﬂation could
have been avoided altogether because the BOJ would have been under con-
tinual pressure not to get behind the curve as it did in the 1992 to 1998 pe-
riod when inﬂation was clearly below 2 percent.
The second feature of inﬂation targeting is that it necessarily focuses on
the management of expectations, which is increasingly viewed as being cru-
cial to the successful conduct of monetary policy. One consequence of the
adoption of inﬂation-targeting regimes is that it puts in place a strong nom-
inal anchor that helps pin down inﬂation expectations (e.g., see Erceg and
Levin 2001). Modern monetary theory (see Woodford 2003) shows that a
strong nominal anchor that pins down inﬂation expectations has major
consequences for the path of actual inﬂation and makes deﬂation much less
likely. These theoretical results are borne out by recent experience where
we have seen major successes in the ability of monetary policy to control
inﬂation in many industrialized countries. We would argue that this is not
because central banks have become so much more knowledgeable about
the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. What has changed in re-
cent years is that central banks in industrialized countries have been able
to put much stronger nominal anchors in place. The result is greatly im-
proved performance on both the inﬂation and output fronts. This of course
has been done by adoption of inﬂation targets, as in New Zealand, Canada,
the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia, and to some extent in the Eu-
ropean Monetary Union.
However, a strong nominal anchor can be put into place without a for-
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the commitment to price stability and actions that are consistent with it.
This is the strategy pursued by the Federal Reserve, which has as strong a
nominal anchor as inﬂation-targeting central banks, although it is embod-
ied in an individual, Alan Greenspan (Mishkin 2000).31 This has worked
well in the United States because Greenspan has understood and empha-
sized in his testimony and speeches that a central bank should be highly
concerned about preventing deﬂation (Greenspan 2002, 2004). However, it
can be dangerous to rely on an individual to do the right thing.
Governor Hayami clearly did not understand the dangers of deﬂation
and continually spoke about the dangers of inﬂation even when the problem
for Japan was the opposite. Furthermore, as we have seen, the BOJ’s actions
under Hayami were not oriented to preventing deﬂation. As a result, the
BOJ has had a credibility problem, particularly under the Hayami regime,
in which the markets and the public did not expect that the BOJ to pursue
expansionary monetary policy in the future, which would ensure that deﬂa-
tion would end. These mistakes in the management of expectations are a
key reason why Japan found itself in a deﬂation that it is ﬁnding very diﬃ-
cult to get out of.32 Indeed, one of the reasons that one of us has advocated
inﬂation targeting for the United States is that an institutional basis for the
nominal anchor is likely to remain strong regardless of who is the head of
the central bank (Mishkin 1999a; Mishkin and Posen 1997; Bernanke,
Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen 1999; Mishkin 2004a, b). In the case of
Japan, having an inﬂation-targeting regime would have made if far more
likely that expectations would have been managed more to prevent deﬂa-
tion, both through actions and words, as advocated by one of us, Ito (1999).
Earlier suggestions for inﬂation targeting were made to help raise inﬂa-
tion expectation in order to get out of the deﬂationary trap (see Krugman
1998). Advocates of inﬂation targeting also suggested that it would be an
appropriate monetary-policy framework for an independent central bank
in order to enhance accountability and transparency of its policy. Ito
(1999) further argued that inﬂation targeting probably enhances instru-
ment independence. Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000; chap. 5) and Ito
and Hayashi (2004; chap. 5) also review major issues in the debate on in-
ﬂation targeting in Japan.
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31. This does not mean that there aren’t reasons for the Federal Reserve to move to an in-
ﬂation target. See Mishkin (2004).
32. BOJ oﬃcials have been quite skeptical of their ability to inﬂuence inﬂation expectation
of the public. “The argument that an increase in the growth rate of the money supply increases
inﬂationary expectations and stimulates aggregate demand by lowering real interest rates
sounds attractive. It is unclear again, however, how this mechanism works when the nominal
interest rate has been already driven down to zero” (Kazuo Ueda, “The Bank of Japan’s For-
ward Looking Approach”—Remarks by Kazuo Ueda, member of the policy board of the
Bank of Japan, at the Meeting on Economic and Financial Matters in Kagoshima, on July 1,
1999).The BOJ was not warm to inﬂation targeting. Many policy board mem-
bers as well as staﬀ economists expressed skeptical views in recorded min-
utes of the policy board meetings (see Fujiki, Okina, and Shiratsuka [2001];
Okina [1999a, b]; and Ueda [2000] for a succinct view). The skeptics argued
that there was no credible tool, beyond ZIRP, to raise the inﬂation rate. In-
ﬂation expectations in the market would not respond to a mere announce-
ment of the target. Therefore, committing to a target when the bank did not
have the tools to achieve it would cause the bank to lose credibility.33
At the earlier stage, that is 1999–2000, there was also an argument that
the deﬁnition of deﬂation was not clear: which prices should be used and
what numbers should be looked at in deﬁning deﬂation.34The BOJ was also
responding to new calls for more careful deﬁnitions of price stability. On
13 October 2000, two months after raising interest rates, the policy board
issued a report called “On Price Stability.” In the document, price stability
was deﬁned as a state that is neither deﬂation nor inﬂation. Its apparent
tautology did not help settle the problem.
Only in March 2001 did the BOJ identify the price index relevant in pol-
icy discussions as the CPI index excluding fresh food (CPIexFood).35 The
relaxed monetary policy would continue until inﬂation rate measured by
the CPIexFood would become stably above zero. In October 2003, “stably”
was further deﬁned as above zero for a few months and when there would
be no risk of falling back into deﬂation.
It is not immediately clear to us why the BOJ was so negative toward non-
conventional monetary policy and inﬂation targeting under the Hayami
regime.36 One possible answer was that inﬂation targeting was interpreted
as a strategy to inﬂate away the nonperforming loans problem. Governor
Hayami repeatedly cautioned that economic boom and inﬂation would
make problem ﬁrms survive longer: inﬂation would delay structural re-
form.37This smacked of the view that “cleansing” was needed, which has a
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33. “[T]he BOJ argues, as is recorded in the minutes of Monetary Policy Meetings, that
‘since we cannot explicitly show the way to achieve the desired inﬂation rate, such action
would most likely result in the BOJ losing credibility’” (Okina 1999b, 165). Critics argued that
there are nonconventional monetary-policy measures that surely make the inﬂation rate go
from negative to positive, the credibility argument is based on incorrect assumptions.
34. “Price indicators such as the GDP deﬂator, CPI, and Wholesale Price Index (WPI) of-
ten move diﬀerently. Even when these indicators exhibit the same movement, the extent to
which the sound development of the national economy will be achieved may depend on such
factors as whether property prices are stable or rising sharply” (Okina 1999a, 164).
35. The Cabinet Oﬃce also changed the deﬁnition of deﬂation in the appendix to the
monthly report of March 2001 from “a state in which prices are falling while the economy is
contracting” to “a state of continuing fall of prices” Available at [http://www5.cao.go.jp/
keizai3/2001/0316getsurei/main.html]).
36. Ito (2004) examines why the BOJ did not adopt inﬂation targeting, based mostly on
minutes of the monetary policy meetings.
37. “When the economy recovers, as is now happening, it might well be the case that eﬀorts
for structural reform might be neglected due to a sense of security. In addition, when the
shadow of structural reform becomes conspicuous, for example in employment, calls to re-strong resonance to what Federal Reserve oﬃcials said during the Great
Depression in the 1930s. This view clearly misinterpreted what inﬂation
targeting is about.
Second, another possibility is that the BOJ fell into the “independence
trap,” as it was called by Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito (2000). Namely, the
BOJ was afraid to take bold actions when it had just gained independence.
Before independence, a usual argument not to lower the interest rate
quickly was that once it was lowered, it would be very diﬃcult, politically,
to raise the interest rate. Achieving independence was supposed to solve this
problem. Flexible adjustments and bold actions were supposed to have be-
come possible. On the contrary, the BOJ became much more conservative
in the sense that it became reluctant to take actions, especially unprece-
dented ones, that might be judged a failure later, arguing that it would be
important to establish credibility early. If this is the case, the BOJ was given
independence precisely at the moment that it should not be given inde-
pendence, because the economy called for unprecedented monetary policy.
Third, one more possible interpretation is that the bank genuinely was
worried about possible deterioration of its balance sheet. Purchasing a
large amount of long-term government bonds would put the balance sheet
at risk if they later declined in value. A question is whether stopping non-
conventional monetary policy on the grounds of a concern about the bal-
ance sheet is desirable from the point of view of avoiding deﬂation and
maximizing potential output. The BOJ is part of the public sector, and any
losses on the bank’s balance sheet would be counterbalanced by gains on
the central government’s balance sheet. Since the BOJ should be consid-
ered as a part of the government from an accounting point of view, concern
about these losses is unwarranted, unless they created political problems
for the bank. The balance sheet of the BOJ should be guaranteed by the
government if it makes sense for the BOJ to take risk in its operations.38 In
this sense, independence came at a wrong moment in history.
4.6.2 What is the Optimal Level of Inﬂation?
A key issue in any inﬂation-targeting regime, whether it targets a path of
the price level or the inﬂation rate, is what is the optimal level of inﬂation
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verse such reform and pressure for additional macroeconomic policy measures such as the ex-
pansion of aggregate demand are very likely to intensify....   Structural problems cannot be
solved solely by macroeconomic policy measures such as monetary and ﬁscal policy. Now
that ﬁnancial and capital markets are highly globalized, any attempt to wipe out past prob-
lems by generating inﬂation will never be successful.” (Speech given by Masaru Hayami, Gov-
ernor of the Bank of Japan, at the Japan Center for Economic Research, Available at [http://
www.boj.or.jp/en/press/00/ko0005b.htm] May 29, 2000)
38. Under the old BOJ law, before 1998, heavy losses on the balance sheet incurred by the
BOJ were automatically ﬁlled by the Ministry of Finance. In the new law of 1998, since poli-
cies of the BOJ were subject to direction of the Minister of Finance, the clause was eliminated
that emphasizes independence of the BOJ.that the central bank should want the price level to grow to over the long
run? In order to decide on the appropriate long-run inﬂation goal, we need
to answer the deeper question of what does price stability mean? Alan
Greenspan has provided a widely cited deﬁnition of price stability as a rate
of inﬂation that is suﬃciently low so that households and businesses do not
have to take it into account in making everyday decisions. This deﬁnition
of price stability is a reasonable one and operationally, any inﬂation num-
ber between 0 and 3 percent seems to meet this criterion. Some economists,
Martin Feldstein (1997) and William Poole (1999) being prominent ex-
amples, argue for a long-run inﬂation goal of 0 percent, which has the psy-
chological appeal of the “magic number” of zero. Indeed one concern is
that an inﬂation goal greater than zero might lead to a decline in central
bank credibility and instability in inﬂation expectations, which could lead
to an upward creep in inﬂation. However, evidence in Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin, and Posen (1999) suggests that maintaining a target for inﬂation
above zero, but not too far above (less than 3 percent), for an extended pe-
riod, does not lead to instability in the public’s inﬂation expectations or to
a decline in central bank credibility.
The BOJ (2000) attempted to deﬁne price stability in October 2000.
However, it concluded that it would not be appropriate to give a numerical
value to price stability, a surprisingly negative attitude toward commitment
to inﬂation targeting:
If some numerical values are adopted as the deﬁnition of price stability,
they are expected to be valid for a very long period of time. In view of the
current development of prices in Japan, it is diﬃcult to set speciﬁc nu-
merical values to the deﬁnition of price stability that are consistent with
the sound development of the economy. Furthermore, even if some nu-
merical values were announced, they would not serve as a reliable guide-
post in the conduct of monetary policy, and the exercise would not likely
contribute to enhancing transparency of the conduct of monetary pol-
icy. Therefore, it is not deemed appropriate to deﬁne price stability by
numerical values. (Bank of Japan, 2000, Summary, Paragraph 5 [2])
There are several reasons why the desirable target rate should be posi-
tive. First, there is an upward bias in CPI by construction.39Second, it helps
the economy to achieve necessary relative price adjustment if some prices
and wages are sticky downward. This is a basis of the argument in Aker-
lof, Dickens, and Perry (1996). Third, an even more persuasive argument
against an inﬂation goal of zero is that it makes it more likely that the econ-
omy will experience episodes of deﬂation. We have argued above that de-
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39. The Laspayres index tends to underestimate the true inﬂation by keeping the basket
ﬁxed, so that the demand shift due to the relative price changes would not be reﬂected. The
new products would not be included. Quality improvement is often ignored.ﬂation can be highly dangerous when it promotes ﬁnancial instability and
in addition can make monetary-policy decisions harder if as a result short-
term interest rates hit a ﬂoor of zero. The implication is that undershoot-
ing a zero inﬂation target (i.e., a deﬂation) is potentially more costly than
overshooting a zero target by the same amount. This can be dealt with by
having a target rate with a buﬀer so that even some perturbation around
the target would not force the economy into deﬂation.
The logic of this argument suggests that setting an inﬂation target a little
above zero is worthwhile because it provides some insurance against
episodes of deﬂation. Simulation evidence in Fuhrer and Madigan (1997);
Orphanides and Weiland (1998); and Reifschneider and Williams (2000)
bear this out, ﬁnding that inﬂation targets near zero (below 2 percent) in-
crease output variability. This is why one of us has argued in Mishkin
(1999a) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) for a long-run
inﬂation goal of 1 percent above true inﬂation. The Boskin commission
(Boskin, et al. 1996) estimated that the measurement bias in CPI inﬂation
was about 1 percent and this is why Bernanke et al. (1999) suggested a CPI
inﬂation goal for the United States of 2 percent.40 In the case of Japan, the
upward bias in measured CPI inﬂation over true inﬂation has been esti-
mated to be 0.9 percent (Shiratsuka 1999), although redeﬁnition of the
price CPI in Japan may mean that the bias is now lower. Adding this to an
inﬂation goal of about 1 percent true inﬂation, an inﬂation goal of near 2
percent for the CPI in Japan makes sense.
Another reason why central banks might be better oﬀ with a long-run
inﬂation goal above zero, is that it is crucial that they not be perceived as
being overly obsessed with controlling inﬂation at the expense of output
stability. If a central bank is perceived as an “inﬂation nutter” in Mervyn
King’s (1996) terminology, in which the central bank puts no weight on
output ﬂuctuations in making its decisions about monetary policy, it is
likely to lose the support of the public. Too low an inﬂation target may sig-
nal to the public that the central bank does not care suﬃciently about the
public’s concerns. It is unstable for a central bank in a democracy to have
a very diﬀerent loss function than the public (Blinder 1998, and Mishkin
1999b), and pursuing too low an inﬂation target may weaken the support
for central bank independence.41
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40. Since the Boskin commission, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has altered its pro-
cedures to reduce the measurement bias in CPI inﬂation. Also the inﬂation bias in the prices
of consumer expenditure (PCE) deﬂator, which appears to be the preferred measure of inﬂa-
tion used by the Federal Reserve, is even lower than for the CPI. This would suggest an even
lower inﬂation goal for this deﬂator.
41. By also emphasizing that the horizon for hitting an inﬂation target will need to be
lengthened in order to not impose large output losses on the economy if inﬂation is far from
target, the central bank can also make clear that it does put a weight on output ﬂuctuations
in making its decisions about monetary policy. See Mishkin (2004).4.6.3 Price-Level Versus Inﬂation Target?
Currently, all countries who have adopted inﬂation targeting have cho-
sen to target inﬂation rate rather than the price level. However, which of
these two targets would result in better economic performance and prevent
deﬂations is still an open question. Here we look at this question when 
the economy is assumed to be experiencing a positive rate of inﬂation. The
answer to this question may be quite diﬀerent when the economy is already
in a prolonged deﬂation and we will address this situation in the following
section.
There are two key advantages of a price-level target relative to an inﬂa-
tion target. The ﬁrst is that a price-level target can reduce the uncertainty
about where the price level will be over long horizons. With an inﬂation tar-
get, misses of the inﬂation target are not reversed by the central bank. The
result is that inﬂation will be a stationary stochastic process, that is, inte-
grated of order zero, I(0), while the price level will be nonstationary, an I(1)
process. The result is that the uncertainty of where the price level will be in
the future grows with the forecast horizon. This uncertainty can make
long-run planning diﬃcult and may therefore lead to a decrease in eco-
nomic eﬃciency. Although, McCallum (1999) has argued that the amount
of long-run uncertainty about the future price level that would arise from
successful adherence to an inﬂation target may not be all that large, it still
complicates the planning process and may lead to more mistakes in invest-
ment decisions.
The second possible advantage of a price-level target is that in models
with a high degree of forward-looking behavior on the part of economic
agents (e.g., Svensson 1999; Woodford 1999, 2003; Svensson and Wood-
ford 2003; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999; Dittmar and Gavin 2000; Vestin
2000) it produces less output variance than an inﬂation target. However,
empirical evidence (Fuhrer 1997) does not clearly support forward-looking
expectations formation, and models with forward-looking behavior have
counterintuitive properties that seem to be inconsistent with inﬂation dy-
namics (Estrella and Fuhrer 1998).
The traditional view, forcefully articulated by Fischer (1994), argues that
a price-level target might produce more output variability than an inﬂation
target because unanticipated shocks to the price level are not treated as by-
gones and must be oﬀset. Speciﬁcally, a price-level target requires that an
overshoot of the target must be reversed and this might require quite con-
tractionary monetary policy and, with sticky prices, this could lead to a
sharp downturn to the real economy in the short run. Indeed, if the over-
shoot is large enough, returning to the target might require a deﬂation, which
could promote ﬁnancial instability and be quite harmful to the economy.
Although the models with a forward-looking price setting do not ﬁnd
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not focus on the fact that a price-level target may lead to more frequent
episodes of deﬂation, which leads to the problems discussed in section 4.2:
deﬂation can exacerbate ﬁnancial instability or can make monetary policy
more diﬃcult to conduct because interest rates cannot go below zero.
These costs of deﬂation tend to make us more skeptical about theoretical
results that indicate that price-level targets are able to reduce output vari-
ability when inﬂation is positive. Indeed, price-level targets which lead to
more episodes of deﬂation may be more dangerous than their proponents
have realized.
In addition, a price-level target may be more diﬃcult to explain to the
public because it is a moving target, in contrast to an inﬂation target, which
is not. Because increased transparency and accountability is a highly de-
sirable attribute for the conduct of monetary policy, this is an important
advantage for an inﬂation target.
Another problem for a price-level target that has received little attention
in the literature is the presence of measurement error in inﬂation. Most re-
search on measurement error takes the view that it is inﬂation that is mea-
sured with error rather than the price leveland this was the approach taken
by the Boskin Commission.42 This implies that the measurement error in
the price level is I(1), that a price-level target results in growing uncertainty
about the true price level as the forecast horizon grows. Thus many of the
arguments that a price-level target results in lower long-run uncertainty
about the true price level may be overstated.
The conﬂicting arguments above indicate that whether price-level rather
than inﬂation targets would produce better outcomes when inﬂation is pos-
itive is an open question. Given this uncertainty about the beneﬁts of price-
level targeting, it is not surprising that no central bank has decided to tar-
get the price level in recent years.43 However, the arguments made here for
preferring an inﬂation target over a price-level target do not rule out hybrid
policies, which combine features of an inﬂation and a price-level target and
so might provide the best of both worlds.
An inﬂation target could be announced with a commitment to some er-
ror correction in which target misses will be oﬀset to some extent in the fu-
ture. Recent research shows that an inﬂation target with a small amount of
error correction can substantially reduce the uncertainty about the price
level in the long run, but still generate very few episodes of deﬂation (e.g.,
Black, Macklem, and Rose 1998; King 1999; Battini and Yates 1999). Fur-
thermore, by putting a small weight on the price-level error-correction term,
the trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation ﬂuctuations can be improved
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42. See Boskin et al. (1996), Moulton (1996), and Shapiro and Wilcox (1996), for example.
43. However, a price-level target was used in the 1930s in Sweden (Berg and Jonung 1999).(e.g., see also Williams 1999; Smets 2000; Gaspar and Smets 2000; McLean
and Pioro 2000). Evaluating hybrid policies of this type is likely to be a ma-
jor focus of future research.
One issue that would have to be addressed if such a hybrid policy was
adopted is how it could be explained to the public. As is emphasized in Ber-
nanke and Mishkin (1997), Mishkin (1999a), and Bernanke, et al. (1999),
critical to the success of inﬂation targeting is that it provides a vehicle for
more eﬀective communication with the public. The public will clearly
not understand the technical jargon of error-correction models. However,
some form of an error-correction feature of an inﬂation-targeting regime
could be communicated by not only announcing an intermediate-term in-
ﬂation target, but also by indicating that there is a target for the average
inﬂation rate over a longer period, say ﬁve years.
4.7 Deﬂation Cures
Once an economy begins to experience a deﬂation, it encounters an ad-
ditional set of problems that alter the issues that confront monetary policy.
First is that the economy may be in a deﬂation trap in which monetary pol-
icy operating through short-term interest rates is powerless to extricate the
economy from the deﬂation because the policy interest rate cannot be
driven below the zero lower bound, which leaves the real interest rate too
high to stimulate recovery. Second, the central bank may have a severe
credibility problem in which the markets and public are unconvinced that
monetary policy can be committed to future expansion that would return
the economy to health. Both of these problems are exactly what we see in
Japan today. As we discussed in section 4.1, the Japanese economy is still
experiencing deﬂation even though short-term interest rates are at zero,
while past BOJ policies, particularly under Hayami, have suggested to the
public that once there is a glimmer of recovery, the monetary authorities
are likely to raise interest rates and tighten monetary policy.
Given these problems, what can be done to get the economy out of the
deﬂationary spiral? We will discuss two key elements of strategies to cure
deﬂation: (a) management of expectations through adoption of a price-
level target, and (b) nonconventional policies that employ central bank
purchases of other assets besides short-term bonds.
4.7.1 Price-Level Targets
According to traditional monetary theory, it might appear as though
monetary policy cannot be eﬀective in escaping the deﬂation trap because
there is no way to drive the standard interest-rate instrument below zero.
However, recent literature (Krugman 1998; Eggertsson and Woodford
2003; Auerbach and Obstfeld 2003; Svensson 2003) suggests that there is a
solution to this problem: management of expectations. If the central bank
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in the future, then even with the interest rate at a ﬂoor of zero, the real in-
terest rate will fall and this will stimulate aggregate demand through the
usual channels (Mishkin 1996). But how is the central bank to do this?
Once an economy has entered a prolonged deﬂation as it has in Japan,
lowering the real interest rate to stimulate the economy requires a sub-
stantial increase in expected inﬂation. This is why Krugman (1998) made
the radical suggestion for the BOJ to adopt an inﬂation target of 4 percent
for a ﬁfteen-year period. However, a high inﬂation target, as suggested by
Krugman, is unlikely to be credible for two reasons. First, a commitment
to a high inﬂation target may not be credible because it is too much at vari-
ance with a goal of price stability. As documented in Bernanke, Laubach,
Mishkin, and Posen (1999), no inﬂation-targeting central bank in an in-
dustrialized country has chosen a medium-term inﬂation target above 3
percent. Indeed, we suspect that the Krugman proposal may have in-
creased the BOJ’s resistance to inﬂation targeting because this level of in-
ﬂation was well above what oﬃcials in the bank believed was consistent
with price stability. Furthermore, once the economy has emerged from a
deﬂationary spiral and starts to recover, the central bank will be tempted
to renege on its commitment to a high inﬂation target because it would like
the economy to return to an inﬂation rate consistent with price stability.
Thus as pointed out by Eggertsson (2003), a central bank in a deﬂationary
environment is subject to a time-inconsistency problem: it cannot credibly
commit to “being irresponsible” and so continue to shoot for high inﬂa-
tion. The result of the time-inconsistency problem is that the markets
would not be convinced the inﬂation would remain high, inﬂation expec-
tations would not be suﬃciently high to lower real rates suﬃciently to stim-
ulate the economy out of the deﬂation trap.
Another problem with an inﬂation target is that it is not “history-
dependent” because it is purely forward-looking (Woodford 2000, 2003).
An inﬂation target is not adjusted depending on the past outcome of inﬂa-
tion, and, as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) have shown, will not be
eﬀective in extricating an economy from a deﬂation trap. When the inter-
est rate has hit a ﬂoor of zero, a deﬂationary shock, which lowers the price
level and puts the economy even farther below its potential, requires an
even higher expected inﬂation in order for the real interest rate to be low-
ered and be even more stimulative. A price-level target does exactly this:
with a price-level target, the same price-level target implies that inﬂation
will be expected to be higher, and this produces exactly the right response
of a lower real interest rate and more stimulative monetary policy.
The theoretical argument for a price-level target when an economy is in
a deﬂationary environment is thus quite strong. But there is a further rea-
son for adoption of a price-level target when an economy has experienced
a prolonged period of deﬂation along with a severe balance-sheet problem
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Posen 1998; Mishkin 1998; Hoshi and Kasyhap 2005). In Japan, nonper-
forming loans have weakened bank balance sheets, and the lack of capital
has meant that banks have been forced to cut back on lending, particularly
for new investment. The result is that the ﬁnancial system is unable to al-
locate capital to productive investment opportunities, and this is a key ele-
ment in the stagnation in Japan. The deﬂation has also weakened corporate
balance sheets, who have found their debt increase in value in real terms
while their assets have not (the debt-deﬂation phenomenon described by
Irving Fisher [1933]). The loss of net worth implies that even ﬁrms with
good investment opportunities may then not be able to get funds at favor-
able rates because the ﬁrm is more likely to engage in risky (moral hazard)
behavior because there is less at stake in the ﬁrm (Mishkin 1997). Thus
restoring both ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial balance sheets is crucial to help-
ing an economy like Japan’s to achieve a more eﬃcient allocation of capi-
tal that will restore it to health.
A price-level target that would get the price level to what it would have
been if the economy had not experienced deﬂation is an important way to
help restore balance sheets. A higher price level would lead to lower real in-
debtedness of ﬁrms and would thereby increase their net worth, making it
more attractive to lend to them if they have productive investment oppor-
tunities. The improvement in ﬁrms’ balance sheets would also help reduce
nonperforming loans which would have a positive knock-on eﬀect on bank
balance sheets, thus making it easier for them to lend.
Furthermore, after a prolonged period of deﬂation, an economy may
need to undergo substantial restructuring if it is to return to health. Both
the BOJ and commentators on the Japanese economy have stressed the
need for restructuring of the Japanese economy.44Indeed, the BOJ has con-
tinually argued that the economy cannot recover without restructuring
and has worried that expansionary monetary policy was seen as an alter-
native to the needed restructuring and thus may be counterproductive.
(This rhetoric seems to have stopped under Governor Fukui’s leadership
after March 2003.) Closing down ineﬃcient ﬁrms and ﬁnancial institu-
tions may be exactly what the economy needs in the long run, but in the
short-run it might lead to severe dislocations and unemployment. Indeed,
this is probably why there has been so much resistance to the restructuring
process on the part of Japanese politicians. Here is where a price-level tar-
get to raise the price level comes in. As we have seen, a higher price level
would help restore ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial balance sheets and would
help the ﬁnancial system to start working again to allocate capital, which
is critical to a restructuring process. Also, to the extent that a commitment
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44. See, for example, Yamaguchi (1999).to a higher price level by the monetary authorities helps raise aggregate de-
mand, this would help cushion the short-term negative eﬀects of the re-
structuring process. A price-level target that encourages more expansion-
ary monetary policy is thus more sensibly viewed as a complement to
restructuring rather than an impediment.
The analysis above suggests that a price-level target has many advan-
tages when an economy is already experiencing deﬂation. Also in this case,
the criticism that a price level might lead to an overshoot of the target that
must be reversed, which could lead to deﬂation and an economic contrac-
tion, is no longer valid. When an economy is in a deﬂation trap and is far
from the appropriate price-level target, the price level is necessarily lower
than the target and so it promotes higher expected inﬂation which lowers
real interest rates, and this then works in exactly the right direction to get
the economy back on track. A price-level target thus dominates an inﬂa-
tion target in a deﬂationary environment.
Note that since October 1997, the CPI excluding fresh food has fallen by
3.7 percent to the present, while annual averages of the CPI has fallen by
2.5 percent between 1998 and 2003. This certainly understates the amount
of deﬂation because, as is well known, measured inﬂation is likely to be an
upward-biased measure of true inﬂation.45Most estimates of measurement
error in CPI inﬂation in industrialized countries is around 1 percent and a
similar ﬁnding has been found for Japan (Shiratsuka 1999). Hence we re-
gard an annual increase in measured CPI at or around 1 percent as ab-
solute price stability. So this would suggest that a target for the CPI would
be 11.7 percent over current (March 2005) levels.46 However, because the
price-level target is a moving target it would continue to rise at the 1 per-
cent rate and so the cumulative price increase when the target is reached
would necessarily be higher in the future.
Let us illustrate our point for a hypothetical price target. Suppose that
the price-level target was reached ﬁve years in the future, by March 2010.
The cumulative increase of the CPI over the ﬁve years would need to be
17.4 percent (which includes the cumulative increase in the target over ﬁve
years of 1 percent a year, 5.1 percent).47 If this target is credible, this would
mean that expected inﬂation would be 3.3 percent over the ﬁve years, and
so seven with a nominal interest rate of zero, the real interest rate would fall
to –3.3 percent, which would be highly stimulative, exactly along the lines
that Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) suggest would be appropriate.
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45. The CPI excluding fresh food was 101.1 in October 1997, which turned out to be a peak.
In February 2004, the index became 97.5 (3.5 percent lower than six years ago). The annual
average of 1998 was 100.4, while it was 98.0 in 2003. The CPIexFood level of 2003 was less
than the peak by 2.4 percent.
46. 1.077   1.037   1.117, for example, an 11.7 percent increase.
47. 1.117   1.051   1.174, for example, a 17.4 percent increase.But what should be done once the price-level target is achieved? One
strand of the literature suggests that it would be optimal to continue with
the price-level target. In models with a high degree of forward-looking be-
havior (e.g., Svensson 1999; Woodford 1999, 2003; Svensson and Wood-
ford 2003; Clarida, Gali, and Gertler 1999; Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland
1999, 2000; Dittmar and Gavin 2000; Vestin 2000; Eggertsson and Wood-
ford 2003) a price-level target produces less output variance than an inﬂa-
tion target. Prices will have a long-run anchor. However, empirical evidence
(for example, Fuhrer 1997) does not clearly support forward-looking ex-
pectations formation, and models with forward-looking behavior have
counterintuitive properties that seem to be inconsistent with inﬂation dy-
namics (Estrella and Fuhrer 1998).
The other strand recommends that inﬂation targeting replace the price-
level targeting once the price-level target is achieved. One reason, as argued
by Fischer (1994), is that output variability will be less in inﬂation target-
ing in a conventional model, as opposed to a heavily forward-looking
mode. A price-level target requires that an overshoot of the target must be
reversed, and this might require contractionary monetary policy which,
with sticky prices, could lead to a sharp downturn in the real economy. Ben
Bernanke (2003) seems to have advanced this position, although he is
somewhat agnostic about the switch. Another reason an inﬂation target
may be more desirable after the price-level target is achieved is that it is a
little easier to explain to the public, because it is not a moving target. In-
creased transparency and accountability is a highly desirable attribute for
the conduct of monetary policy.
4.7.2 Nonconventional Monetary Policy
Critics of inﬂation targeting (Friedman 2003) have argued that the con-
cept of “managing expectations” is problematic. Why would announcing
an inﬂation or a price-level target pin down expectations? Aren’t actions
more important than words? Words by themselves are not enough, but nei-
ther are actions. This argues for the use of words plus actions in the con-
duct of monetary policy.
This raises the issue of what actions will actually inﬂuence the economy
and help make a price-level or inﬂation target credible, particularly when
the policy interest rate has hit a ﬂoor of zero? Once the short-term, policy
interest rate is at the ﬂoor of zero, it clearly cannot be driven lower. Thus
the conventional monetary-policy tool of manipulating the short-term,
policy interest rate is no longer an option. Is the central bank powerless?
What nonconventional policy measures can it take to aﬀect the economy
and thereby achieve its price-level or inﬂation target? We look at four types
of measures below: (a) quantitative easing, (b) openmarket operations in
long-term bonds, (c) foreign exchange rate intervention, and (d) open mar-
ket purchases of private, real assets.
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The nonconventional monetary policy tried by the BOJ has been the so-
called “quantitative easing.” This involves an expansion of the monetary
base, even when the policy interest rate cannot be driven any lower, either
through open market operations on short-term government debt, outright
purchase of long-term bonds (or equities), or through unsterilized pur-
chases of foreign currency. The BOJ has been conducting such a policy
since March 2001, and more aggressively since December 2001.
Figure 4.6 shows growth rates of monetary base (MB) and the money
supply (M2   CD, hereafter simply M2). MB had indeed expanded
quickly from the end of 2001, but with little impact on M2. How to explain
the deviation between MB and M2 is a challenge, and another is whether
an expansion of MB without an expansion of M2 has positive impacts on
the economy. The monetary base includes the amount of current account
at the BOJ, the amount of excess liquidity in the system. In normal times,
excess reserves would be unlikely to help stimulate the economy. However,
an expansion of the monetary base might be beneﬁcial even if it does not
produce a signiﬁcant increase in M2 when the interest rate is zero. First,
ample liquidity in the system may help avoid a potential ﬁnancial crisis that
was a concern in 2002–2003. Second, liquidity may encourage ﬁnancial in-
stitutions to take more risks in portfolio management, in particular taking
positions in long-term bonds, equities, and foreign bonds, any of which
would contribute to stimulating the economy indirectly. The economic re-
covery in 2003 may be partly due to ample liquidity in the system.
However, the data do not look favorable to this approach. The monetary
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Fig. 4.6 M2   CD and monetary base, 1995:1–2004:1base has increased by 20–40 percent from 2002 to 2003 and yet deﬂation
has not stopped. One problem with coming to this conclusion based on the
evidence from Japan is that, as we have seen in the earlier section of this
chapter, the BOJ has created market expectations that even when it pur-
sued expansionary monetary policy for a time, it would soon reverse it.
Then it is no surprise that quantitative easing would not work.
In addition, there are good theoretical reasons why quantitative easing
might be ineﬀective. The conventional liquidity-trap analysis suggests that
when the short-term interest rate hits a ﬂoor of zero, short-term bonds be-
come a perfect substitute for money and so expanding the monetary base
will have no eﬀect on the economy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) show
that this result can even hold if short-term bonds and money do not be-
come perfect substitutes, although this conclusion still is based on the spe-
ciﬁc assumptions of their model. However, as they emphasize, quantitative
easing might help stimulate the economy if it provided a signal that the
monetary base would be higher than it otherwise would be once the deﬂa-
tion is over. This is the position taken by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003).
Given the theoretical arguments against its being eﬀective and the fact
that quantitative easing has not worked to stimulate the economy and stop
deﬂation in Japan, there is clearly a strong case that the BOJ needs to look
at other approaches to conducting monetary policy.
Open Market Operations in Long-Term Bonds
Alternative nonconventional monetary policies involve the monetary
authorities in conducting open market operations in other assets besides
short-term bonds. The most conventional of these is a shift toward central
bank purchases of long-term rather than short-term bonds. Since long-
term interest rates are more likely to ﬁgure in household and business de-
cisions about spending, it seems that open market purchase of these bonds
might succeed in lowering long-term interest rates, thereby stimulating the
economy. However, in order for purchase of long-term bonds to work there
would have to be signiﬁcant portfolio-balance eﬀects, so that a shift in the
supply of long-term versus short-term government debt in the hands of the
public as a result of the open market purchases would aﬀect risk (term)
premiums and so result in a fall in long-term rates. However, the evidence
that risk (term) premiums can be aﬀected by changing the supply of long-
term bonds relative to short-term bonds in the hands of the public is, un-
fortunately, far from clear. One episode in which this was tried was the so-
called “Operation Twist” in the United States in the early 1960s and it has
generally been viewed as a failure with only a very small eﬀect—if any—
on the relative interest rates of long versus short-term bonds (see Meulen-
dyke [1998] for a summary of the literature).
Bernanke (2002) has suggested that the apparent failure of “Operation
Twist” does not mean that the central bank could not drive long-term bond
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est rates on long-term bonds at a very low interest rate (possibly zero) and
stood ready to purchase any amounts of these bonds at this low rate. This
peg could certainly work because the commitment is easily veriﬁable since
the price and interest rates on long-term bonds are immediately known.
However, this could require the central bank to purchase the entire stock
of long-term bonds which it might not be fully comfortable about doing.
Clearly another way for the central bank to lower long-term bond rates
(Orphanides and Wieland 2000) is to convince the markets that it will con-
tinue to pursue a zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) for a considerable time
even after the deﬂation is over. Then, as is suggested by the expectations hy-
pothesis of the term structure, because long-term bond rates are an aver-
age of the expected future short-term rates, long-term interest rates would
necessarily fall. Indeed, this strategy is complimentary to Bernanke’s
(2002) because it is a way of committing to more expansionary policy in the
future even after the economy has bounced back.
The BOJ’s announcements about clarifying the conditions of exit from
the ZIRP have some elements of this strategy. The BOJ has eﬀectively an-
nounced that it will not reverse the ZIRP policy until there is clear-cut evi-
dence that the deﬂation is over and that it is unlikely to recur in the future.
However, this is a far weaker commitment than the strategy above suggests.
It requires a commitment to stay with ZIRP not only until the deﬂation is
clearly over, but until there is a prospect of achieving the price-level target
described above in which the CPI would have to rise substantially to get to
the target.48 There is still the problem that an announcement of this type
might not be believed by the markets because of the past behavior of the cen-
tral bank, and this is clearly a problem for the BOJ because of the policies
under Governor Hayami where the ZIRP was reversed as soon as the econ-
omy began to recover. However, this is where the purchase of long-term
bonds might help. The central bank could buy substantial amounts of these
long-term bonds as a signal of its conﬁdence that their price will remain high
because ZIRP will be continued well after the deﬂation is over. Buying long-
term bonds would also provide incentives for the central bank to stick with
the ZIRP policy after the deﬂation is over because premature abandonment
of ZIRP would lead to losses on the long-term bonds that it has bought.
Foreign Exchange Intervention
Depreciation of the currency provides an additional way of exiting from
a deﬂation trap. A fall in the value of the domestic currency makes imports
more expensive and exports cheaper. The result is expenditure switching in
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48. In order not to overshoot the target, ZIRP would have to be removed a little while be-
fore the target is reached, but for all practical purposes, this would be a commitment to keep
ZIRP for a substantial period after the deﬂation is over.which exports rise and imports fall, thereby increasing the demand for do-
mestically produced goods, which stimulates aggregate demand. Interven-
tion in the foreign exchange market, the selling of yen and purchase of for-
eign currency, has thus been suggested as a powerful way of getting the
Japanese economy moving again (Bernanke 2000; McCallum 2000a, b,
2002, 2003; Meltzer 2001; Orphanides and Wieland 2000; Svensson 2001,
2003). Indeed, in recent years the Ministry of Finance and the BOJ inter-
vened in the foreign exchange market to keep the yen from appreciating,
but have not engineered a depreciation of the yen.
One problem with this transmission mechanism is that it also requires
that portfolio-balance eﬀects are operational. The exchange rate interven-
tion in which the purchase of foreign-denominated assets are bought with
domestic currency, thereby increasing the supply of domestic currency-
denominated assets relative to foreign-denominated assets, only aﬀects
the exchange rate if domestic and foreign assets are imperfect substitutes.
As was the case for short-term versus long-term bonds, the evidence for
portfolio-balance eﬀects are not strong (see the survey in Sarno and Tay-
lor 2001).
However, here is where a price-level target and the management of ex-
pectations can again come to the rescue. Svensson (2001, 2003) has advo-
cated that, along with an announcement of a price-level target along the
lines we have described above, the government and/or the central bank (de-
pending on who controls foreign exchange intervention) commit to an ex-
change rate peg that is consistent with that price-level target. This involves
a commitment to an immediate depreciation of the domestic currency,
which would then be allowed to appreciate at the rate of the foreign inter-
est rate diﬀerential (so that the expected return on foreign and domestic as-
sets is equalized). The peg would then be abandoned once the price-level
target has been achieved and a price-level or inﬂation-targeting regime
would be put into place. Committing to the peg is also a commitment to
the higher price-level target and continued expansionary monetary policy
even after the deﬂation is over. Thus it solves the commitment problem de-
scribed above.
Since the policy calls for a substantial depreciation of the domestic cur-
rency from current levels, it would require that the government or central
bank stand ready to buy large amounts of foreign-denominated assets to
ensure that they are a good investment relative to domestic assets. This
would just mean an accumulation of international reserves, which is always
feasible. (This is in contrast to a case in which a country wants to prop up
the value of its currency and thus must sell foreign assets, thereby losing in-
ternational reserves, which may run out and thus force the abandonment
of the peg.) The commitment to a peg also has the advantage that it pro-
vides incentives for the central bank and the government to stick with the
peg until the price-level target is achieved: early abandonment would lead
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stantial losses on the holdings of international reserves.
Although we agree with Svensson that his “foolproof way” to escape the
deﬂation trap would work, we do have our doubts about this strategy. Such
a strategy suﬀers from two diﬃculties. First, the country’s trading partners
would be likely to be up in arms if an exchange-rate peg of this type were
announced. We have seen strong U.S. complaints against the Chinese peg
of the yuan at, most likely, an undervalued rate, and we expect that this out-
cry would be even harsher if Japan adopted Svensson’s suggestion. The
outcome might be trade sanctions and a rise in protectionism that could be
disastrous for the world trading system.
A second problem is that adoption of an exchange rate peg might cause
a shift of the nominal anchor away from the price-level or inﬂation target
to the exchange rate. For example, as part of its inﬂation-targeting regime,
Israel has had an intermediate target of an exchange rate band around a
crawling peg, whose rate of crawl is set in a forward-looking manner by de-
riving it from the inﬂation target for the coming year. Even though the Bank
of Israel downplayed the exchange rate target relative to the inﬂation target
over time, it did slow the bank’s eﬀorts to win support for disinﬂation and
lowering of the inﬂation targets (see Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and
Posen 1999). A recent example of this problem has occurred in Hungary
(Jonas and Mishkin 2004), which has an exchange rate band as part of its
inﬂation-targeting regime. In January 2003, the forint appreciated to the
upper end of the band, and speculation about the revaluation of the parity
resulted in a sharp acceleration of capital inﬂows that forced the National
Bank of Hungary to respond by cutting interest rates by 2 percentage
points and intervening heavily in the foreign exchange market. The Na-
tional Bank of Hungary is reported to have bought more than 5 billion eu-
ros, increasing international reserves by 50 percent and base money by 70
percent. (See J. P. Morgan [2003].) Even though the National Bank of
Hungary subsequently began to sterilize this huge injection of liquidity,
market participants then assumed that maintaining the exchange rate band
would have a priority over the inﬂation target and expected inﬂation in
2003 to exceed the National Bank of Hungary’s inﬂation target by 5 per-
centage points.49
A third problem with an exchange rate target is that it can induce the
wrong policy response when a country is faced with real shocks, such as a
terms-of-trade shock. Two graphic examples occurred in New Zealand and
Chile in the late 1990s. By early 1997, the Reserve Bank institutionalized
this focus by adopting as its primary indicator of monetary policy at Mon-
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49. Analysts have interpreted this as evidence that the National Bank of Hungary is deter-
mined to maintain the currency band even at the cost of temporary higher inﬂation. See Jonas
and Mishkin (2004).etary Conditions Index (MCI) similar to that developed by the Bank of
Canada. The idea behind the MCI, which is a weighted average of the ex-
change rate and a short-term interest rate, is that both interest rates and 
exchange rates on average have oﬀsetting impacts on inﬂation. When the
exchange rate falls, this usually leads to higher inﬂation in the future, and
so interest rates need to rise to oﬀset the upward pressure on inﬂation.
However, the oﬀsetting eﬀects of interest rates and exchange rates on in-
ﬂation depend on the nature of the shocks to the exchange rates. If the ex-
change rate depreciation comes from portfolio considerations, then it does
lead to higher inﬂation and needs to be oﬀset by an interest rate rise. How-
ever, if the reason for the exchange rate depreciation is a real shock, such
as a negative terms-of-trade shock, which decreases the demand for a
country’s exports, then the situation is entirely diﬀerent. The negative
terms-of-trade shock reduces aggregate demand and is thus likely to be de-
ﬂationary. The correct interest rate response is then a decline in interest
rates, not a rise as the MCI suggests.
With the negative terms-of-trade shock in 1997, the adoption of the MCI
in 1997 led to exactly the wrong monetary-policy response to East Asian
crisis. With depreciation setting in after the crisis began in July 1997 after
the devaluation of the Thai baht, the MCI began a sharp decline, indicat-
ing that the Reserve Bank needed to raise interest rates, which it did by over
200 basis points. The result was very tight monetary policy, with the
overnight cash rate exceeding 9 percent by June of 1998. Because the de-
preciation was due to a substantial, negative terms-of-trade shock that de-
creased aggregate demand, the tightening of monetary policy, not surpris-
ingly, lead to a severe recession and an undershoot of the inﬂation-target
range with actual deﬂation occurring in 1999.50 The Reserve Bank of New
Zealand did eventually realize its mistake and reversed course, sharply
lowering interest rates beginning in July 1998 after the economy had en-
tered a recession, but by then it was too late.
Chile’s inﬂation-targeting regime also included a focus on limiting ex-
change rate ﬂuctuations by having an exchange rate band with a crawling
peg that was (loosely) tied to lagged domestic inﬂation. This focus on the
exchange rate induced a serious policy mistake in 1998 because the central
bank was afraid it might lose credibility in the face of the ﬁnancial turmoil
if it allowed the exchange rate to depreciate after what had taken place in ﬁ-
nancial markets after the East Asian crisis and the Russian meltdown. Thus
instead of easing monetary policy in the face of the negative terms-of-trade
shock, the central bank raised interest rates sharply and even narrowed its
exchange rate band. The result was that the inﬂation target was undershot
and the economy entered a recession for the ﬁrst time in the 1990s. With
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50. The terms-of-trade shock, however, was not the only negative shock the New Zealand
economy faced during that period. Its farm sector experienced a severe drought, which also
hurt the economy. Thus, a mistake in monetary policy was not the only source of the reces-
sion. Bad luck played a role too. See Drew and Orr (1999) and Brash (2000).this outcome, the central bank came under strong criticism for the ﬁrst time
since it had adopted its inﬂation-targeting regime in 1990, weakening sup-
port for the independence of the central bank and its inﬂation-targeting
regime. During 1999, the central bank did reverse course, easing monetary
policy by lowering interest rates and allowing the peso to decline.
The contrast of the experience of New Zealand and Chile during this pe-
riod with that of Australia, another small open economy with an inﬂation-
targeting regime, is striking. Prior to adoption of their inﬂation-targeting
regime in 1994, the Reserve Bank of Australia had adopted a policy of al-
lowing the exchange rate to ﬂuctuate without interference, particularly if
the source of the exchange rate change was a real shock, like a terms-of-
trade shock. Thus when faced with the devaluation in Thailand in July
1997, the Reserve Bank recognized that it would face a substantial negative
terms-of-trade shock because of the large component of its foreign trade
conducted with the Asian region and that it should not ﬁght the deprecia-
tion of the Australian dollar that would inevitably result.51Thus in contrast
to New Zealand, it immediately lowered the overnight cash rate by 50 ba-
sis points to 5 percent and kept it near this level until the end of 1998, when
it was lowered again by another 25 basis points.
A more subtle approach to exchange rate intervention can avoid some of
the problems of an exchange rate peg. Intervention in the foreign exchange
market to depreciate the domestic currency could be an important element
of nonconventional monetary policy of raising price-level expectations,
without announcing a precise exchange rate target. Instead the central
bank and the government could emphasize that exchange rate interven-
tions, along with other measures, are being conducted as a method of pur-
suing expansionary monetary policy and to achieve a higher price level and
a stronger economy. These interventions would then be unsterilized in or-
der to make clear that their primary purpose is to produce expansionary
monetary policy that raises the price level and is not focused on a target
level of the exchange rate.52 The communication strategy would also be
helped by having the government and the central bank emphasize that the
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51. See MacFarlane (1999) and Stevens (1999).
52. Under the Hayami regime, the BOJ resisted the suggestion that interventions be un-
sterilized. Since interventions are decided and conducted by the Ministry of Finance, making
interventions unsterilized was seen as a dictation of monetary policy by the Ministry of Fi-
nance—a violation to independence. In 2003, under the Fukui regime, interventions became
more frequent on the part of the Ministry of Finance, and quantitative easing was accelerated
on the part of the BOJ. From January 2003 to December 2003, about 15 trillion yen of inter-
ventions increased the yen in the market in exchange for an increase in inventory of foreign
currencies, while the ceiling of the BOJ current account target was raised by 12 trillion yen.
Deputy Governor Iwata in his reply to a question in the press conference on October 1, 2003
acknowledged that these two actions, ex post, were equivalent to unsterilized interventions,
although “it must be a coincident.” This is a much more nuanced statement than a typical re-
action during the Hayami regime (press interview, October 1, 2003, available in Japanese text
through the BOJ homepage at [http://www.boj.or.jp/press/03/kk0310a.htm], translated by
one of the authors of this paper).exchange rate interventions to escape from the deﬂation trap would even-
tually help encourage purchases of foreign goods and would eventually be
highly beneﬁcial for the country’s trading partners.
At the zero interest rate, the diﬀerences between sterilized and unsteril-
ized intervention, namely the interest rate channel, disappear. However,
even at the zero interest rate, we believe that the unsterilized intervention is
more stimulative than sterilized intervention, primarily due to a signaling
eﬀect. Unsterilized intervention provides one more instrument to achieve
quantitative easing, and conducting unsterilized intervention will make the
central bank look more willing to commit to continuing ZIRP in the future.
Open Market Purchase of Private, Real Assets
An even more radical step for monetary authorities would be to pur-
chase real assets, such as stocks, corporate bonds, or real estate. Purchase
of these assets would raise their prices directly and would lead to expansion
in aggregate demand though a number of channels of monetary transmis-
sion (Mishkin 1996). Purchase of real assets would also directly help re-
store balance sheets in the economy and help get the ﬁnancial system work-
ing again, which we have seen is crucial to recovery if the country ﬁnds
itself in a situation like Japan’s.
However, central bank purchase of these assets is not without problems.
Government purchase of private assets can be highly politicized. Which as-
sets should the central bank buy? Diﬀerent elements in the private sector
would lobby for purchase of the assets that would make them proﬁts. Some
of this problem could be mitigated by the central bank buying broad-based
bundles of assets or market indexes so that speciﬁc private ﬁrms do not
beneﬁt over others. However, there is still the question of how much real es-
tate should be bought versus stocks, or how much corporate bonds versus
equities. Decisions on what to buy would have important distributional
consequences, which would put the central bank under intense political
pressure. Not only might this result in distortionary decisions, but it could
politicize the central bank and interfere with the independence that this in-
stitution has worked so hard to get.
Another problem with central bank purchase of private assets is that it
involves the government in ownership of the private sector. The trend in re-
cent years has been toward privatization because it is believed that the
private sector has better incentives to produce eﬃciently than does the gov-
ernment sector. Having substantial purchases of private assets by the cen-
tral bank, which after all is a government entity, goes against this trend.
Maybe the problems of central bank ownership of private assets can be
minimized by announcing that the central bank will have no involvement
in running of the companies or real estate that it has taken a position in,
but political pressures may make this hard to do.
If central bank purchases of private, real assets are sizeable, there could
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ever, if nothing else worked, then this more radical step might be necessary
as a way of stimulating the economy and achieving a higher price level.
Our discussion here has indicated that none of the nonconventional
monetary-policy strategies are without their problems. There is thus an ar-
gument for what might be crudely described as a “kitchen sink” or “throw
it against the wall and see if it sticks” approach. Because it would not be
clear how well the diﬀerent approaches would work, some or all of them
could be tried to see which ones work best. One concern might be that the
uncertainty about the impact of the diﬀerent approaches might make it
harder to be sure of what the outcome of using them might be. One out-
come would be paralysis and then not to try any of them.
There are two responses to these concerns. The ﬁrst is that having a
clear-cut price-level/inﬂation target to pin down expectations can make it
highly likely that less conventional tools of monetary policy can achieve
the goal of price stability and that inﬂation would not spin out of control.
In recent years we have seen major successes in the ability of monetary pol-
icy to control inﬂation in many industrialized countries. We would argue
that this is not because central banks have become so much more knowl-
edgeable about the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy. What
has changed in recent years is that central banks in industrialized countries
have been able to put much stronger nominal anchors in place. The result
is greatly improved performance on both the inﬂation and output fronts.
One method has been to adopt inﬂation targets, as in New Zealand,
Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Australia, and to some extent
in the European Monetary Union.53 Alternatively, a strong nominal an-
chor can be put into place without a formal inﬂation target through direct
communication with the public about the commitment to price stability
and actions that are consistent with it. This is the strategy pursued by the
Federal Reserve, which has as strong a nominal anchor as inﬂation-
targeting, central banks although it is embodied in an individual, Alan
Greenspan (Mishkin 2000). Adopting a price-level target and then possi-
bly moving to an inﬂation target would go a long way to ensuring an escape
from the deﬂation trap, while making it highly unlikely that inﬂation would
spin out of control thereafter.
4.8 Concluding Remarks
This chapter reviews the experience of Japanese monetary policy over
the last two decades with an emphasis on the experience of deﬂation from
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53. The European Central Bank does not oﬃcially call their monetary policy strategy “in-
ﬂation targeting,” but it is pretty close: there is a strong commitment to price stability and an
explicit inﬂation goal of “less than but close to 2%” has been announced.the mid-1990s. The cost of deﬂation is quite high, and prolonged deﬂation
makes getting out of it more diﬃcult. A key element in escaping deﬂation
is the management of expectations and we have seen that price-level and in-
ﬂation targeting attempt to achieve exactly this. Also, because the credibil-
ity of price-level and inﬂation targets require actions, nonconventional
policy measures become relevant when prices are declining and the zero
lower bound on interest rates means that the overnight interest rate can no
longer be used as the instrument of monetary policy.
We are quite critical of the conduct of the BOJ monetary policy from
1998 to 2003. The Bank of Japan’s rhetoric was not helpful in ﬁghting de-
ﬂation, and the interest rate hike in August 2000 amid deﬂation was a seri-
ous mistake. Although rhetoric has improved since 2003 under the new
Governor Fukui, more is needed to get out of deﬂation completely. We sur-
veyed the literature on cost of deﬂation, the optimal level of inﬂation, and
relative merits of price-level versus inﬂation targets. A key to curing deﬂa-
tion is management of expectations, and here a history-dependent policy
involving a price-level target can help. However, because actions speak
louder than words, management of expectations also involves nonconven-
tional monetary policies. Admittedly, there is uncertainty about how these
policies would work, but a combination of them can help the Japanese
economy escape its deﬂationary trap.
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Comment Kenneth Kuttner
The broad objectives of this vast chapter are twofold. The ﬁrst is to provide
a deﬁnitive overview of Japanese monetary policy since the mid-1980s. The
Japanese experience is then used to motivate its second objective, which is
to survey recent macroeconomic research on the deﬂation problem, and
using this, to propose policies to help solve Japan’s deﬂation problem. With
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Kenneth Kuttner is the Danforth-Lewis Professor of Economics at Oberlin College, and a
faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.two decades of economic history and an extensive literature to cover, the
chapter’s scope is a little overwhelming. The goals of these comments,
therefore, are to highlight and clarify some of its major themes, and to
identify a few areas where the chapter makes particularly valuable contri-
butions. A number of unresolved issues deserving of further investigation
will also be noted.
The ﬁrst half of the chapter, consisting of sections 4.2 through 4.4, sum-
marizes the policies pursued by the BOJ over the past twenty years, and
some of the many critiques of those policies. Section 4.2 deals with the pe-
riod prior to the BOJ’s formal independence, granted in 1998, while section
4.3 takes up the performance of the independent BOJ. Section 4.4 presents
and discusses the pitfalls of an eﬀort to assess the BOJ’s policies using an
empirical policy-reaction function.
The detailed chronology of the BOJ’s policies contained in sections 4.2
and 4.3 stands as one of the chapter’s major accomplishments, and is likely
to serve as an important reference for years to come. While many of the
episodes covered in the Ito-Mishkin chronology have been discussed else-
where, the presentation in this chapter is both comprehensive and com-
pact, and beneﬁts from Ito’s ﬁrsthand policy experience while serving in
the Ministry of Finance. Along with the narrative, sections 4.2 and 4.3 con-
sider a number of the critiques that have been made of BOJ policies over
the years. These include the BOJ’s failure to act more aggressively to pre-
vent the asset-price bubble of the late 1980s, its slow response to the onset
of the recession in the early 1990s, the reversal of the ZIRP in 2000, and the
Bank’s failure to “manage expectations” eﬀectively.
Overall, the authors are relatively sympathetic to the BOJ’s predicament
in the late 1980s, acknowledging that the strong Yen and generally low in-
ﬂation rates presented the bank with a dilemma that, to some extent,
explains its restrained response to asset-price inﬂation. Others, such as
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000), are more critical of BOJ policy during
this period, arguing that the bank’s misplaced emphasis on the exchange
rate kept it from responding to real economic conditions which, by the late
1980s, would have called for signiﬁcantly tighter policy. Regardless of the
assessment, clearly this episode represents an interesting case study in the
potential pitfalls of exchange rate management, and probably deserves a
more detailed analysis.
The bulk of the authors’ criticism is reserved for the bank’s Hayami-era
policies—the premature abandonment of the ZIRP in 2000 is labeled a
“clear policy mistake,” and in the authors’ view, this (and other missteps)
have “left the Bank of Japan with a severe credibility problem in which the
markets and the public are unconvinced that Japanese monetary policy can
be committed to future expansion that would return the economy to
health.” The authors’ assessment of this period accurately reﬂects the con-
sensus view, at least among academic economists, that monetary policy
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nation. In emphasizing the potential role for monetary policy, however, the
chapter gives scant attention to supply-side explanations for the slow pace
of economic growth, such as that of Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
Section 4.4 supplements the narrative approach of sections 4.2 and 4.3
with a quantitative analysis based on empirical reaction-functions, or gen-
eralized “Taylor rules.” There are two basic ways reaction functions are
used to assess monetary policy. The ﬁrst, referred to by Kuttner and Posen
(2004) as the “calibration” approach, is to insert output gap and inﬂation
measures into a reaction function with calibrated parameters (typically
Taylor’s) imposed a priori; if the implied interest rate path is lower than the
actual policy rate, policy is deemed “too tight.” The alternative, “estima-
tion” approach is to estimate the reaction-function parameters and com-
pare those estimates to “good” parameter values, such as Taylor’s; in Ja-
pan’s context, the interesting question is the extent to which policy did (or
did not) react to output ﬂuctuations.
Unfortunately, reaction-function analysis of this sort is subject to a
number of methodological problems and pitfalls, as discussed in detail in
Kuttner and Posen (2004). Chief among these is the choice of output gap
measure, an issue that is especially germane to the case of Japan, where
most simple time-series methods (including those used by Ito and Mish-
kin) would spuriously attribute a signiﬁcant portion of a prolonged cycli-
cal slump to a reduction in trend growth. Not surprisingly, policy assess-
ments consequently tend to be very sensitive to the choice of method used
to estimate potential output.
Ito and Mishkin run headlong into these problems in their eﬀorts to as-
sess BOJ policy. Their approach, which is to estimate a Taylor rule up
through 1994 and calculate projections from 1995 onward, yields results
that are plausible in some dimensions but odd in others. While the results
suggest the BOJ should have run a tighter policy in the late 1980s, policy
during the critical 1992–95 period is judged to be “about right”—and im-
plies a signiﬁcant tightening of policy in 1996–97. Calling these results
“counterintuitive,” the authors end up largely rejecting the Taylor-rule ap-
proach as uninformative, at least for the case of Japan. This conclusion is
surely well founded, for all the reasons listed in the chapter, as well as those
outlined in Kuttner and Posen (2004).
Nonetheless, the exercise contains one important result that deserves
additional emphasis: the lack of a signiﬁcant response to the output gap in
the speciﬁcation with a forward-looking inﬂation measure. A similar lack
of output response has also been reported by Kuttner and Posen (2001);
Jinushi, Kuroki, and Miyao (2000); and Ahearne et al. (2002). Estimates
for the U.S. Federal Reserve, on the other hand, such as those reported by
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), typically show an economically mean-
ingful response to output gap ﬂuctuations. The Fed’s sharp rate cuts in
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rate reduction cannot be rationalized purely as a response to a drop in ex-
pected inﬂation. (With an inﬂation coeﬃcient of 1.5, the observed rate re-
duction would imply an implausibly large 3.7 percent decline in inﬂation
expectations.) Thus, the lack of attention to real economic conditions re-
vealed by the estimated reaction function may well have contributed to
Japan’s economic malaise.
The chapter’s second half (sections 4.5 through 4.7) is primarily a survey
of recent research on deﬂation and the ZLB problem. In its survey of the
literature, the chapter covers relatively well-trodden ground; it adds value,
however, in interweaving its survey with a discussion on how this research
might apply to the case of Japan. Drawing on this research, the authors rec-
ommend the adoption of a price-level target designed to bring prices back
up to where they would have been had there been a steady, low rate of in-
ﬂation. This sensible proposal can be interpreted as a simpliﬁed version of
the rule advanced by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), and it is rational-
ized by a similar set of considerations.
The BOJ has over the years strenuously resisted calls for an explicit price
or inﬂation target, however; and despite BOJ Governor Fukui’s apparently
more sympathetic attitude to reﬂationary policies, the likelihood of the
Ito–Mishkin proposal being adopted surely remains slim. In the past, the
BOJ oﬃcials have argued that, because the bank lacked the tools to achieve
an inﬂation target, the announcement of a target would undermine its
credibility. There is a certain undeniable logic to the view that announcing
a target is futile without the means to achieve it. It is worth stressing, how-
ever, that this pessimistic assessment requires either that “unconventional”
policies are ineﬀective (a view that the disappointing experience with quan-
titative easing has done little to dispel), or that the ZLB will always bind.
Searching for a deeper explanation, Ito and Mishkin oﬀer three hypoth-
eses for the BOJ’s resistance to an inﬂation target: ﬁrst, BOJ oﬃcials’ belief
in the “cleansing” value of restrictive policy; second, a concern that a com-
mitment to reﬂation would undermine its newly won independence; and
third, a fear that unconventional or overly expansionary policies would
jeopardize the bank’s balance sheet.
These are not the only possibilities, however. The authors might add to
their list of hypotheses the possibility that the BOJ may have been using
monetary policy as a weapon in its tussles with the Ministry of Finance
over ﬁscal policy. Alternatively, BOJ oﬃcials may actually have believed
that Japan’s deﬂation was “good,” a symptom of enhanced productivity
and eﬃciency. BOJ oﬃcials have also on occasion voiced concerns that
once inﬂation began, it would quickly accelerate, as a result of the large
“overhang” of liquidity in the ﬁnancial system.
Some of these obstacles are probably impervious to economic reason-
ing; if policy is being handicapped by bureaucratic inﬁghting, then there is
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such as the threat of insolvency or a liquidity overhang, merit a more de-
tailed rejoinder. Perhaps in a sequel to this chapter, the authors will take up
some of these arguments and refute them in a more systematic fashion—
and in doing so, advance the cause of sound monetary policy in Japan.
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Comment Kazuo Ueda
The chapter by Ito and Mishkin consists of four parts. First, it discusses the
macroeconomics of the so-called lost decade. Second, it provides a narra-
tive description of the BOJ’s monetary policy during the last decade or two.
Third, it presents an analysis of the Taylor rule as applied to the Japanese
situation and shows the diﬃculties of using it as a guide for monetary pol-
icy. Fourth, it discusses the pros and cons of nonconventional operations
that may be used close to the ZLB on nominal interest rates.
My quick reaction to the authors’ analyses is: the discussion of the
macroeconomics of the lost decade misses some important points. The nar-
rative account of the BOJ’s policy is partly accurate, partly unfair. The
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standing about what the BOJ has been doing. Finally, the section on un-
conventional operations is well written, although I do not quite buy the au-
thors’ conclusion, which seems to be just go ahead and do them no matter
what the costs are. I am afraid that, given my current position, I am unable
to comment in detail on the second part of the chapter. Hence, in the fol-
lowing I will discuss the remaining three parts of the chapter.
Let me start with the discussion of the macroeconomics of the Japanese
economy. The authors assert that macro deﬂation has been the number one
enemy of the economy. This seems to miss the point. Figure 4C.1 shows
Japan’s deﬂation of the CPI. The deﬂationary tendency did not set in until
the late 1990s when macroeconomic problems of the economy were already
apparent. In addition, the deﬂation has been mild. In ﬁgures 4C.2 and 4C.3
I show estimates of ex post real interest rates in Japan for the Great De-
pression period and for the post-1990 period. Unlike in the former, there is
no tendency for the real interest rate to rise with deﬂation in the late 1990s.
That is, no serious debt-deﬂation type dynamic was taking hold in the post-
1990 era.
Instead, the stagnation of the economy during the era seems to have
been due to the excesses—excess capital, labor, debt, and so on—built up
during the bubble period and negative ﬁnancial accelerators generated by
the sharp fall in asset prices as argued in Baba et al. (2004). The authors
seem to realize the importance of these factors, but put too much weight
on the negative eﬀects of macro deﬂation.
I now turn to the discussion of policy measures recently adopted by the
BOJ. The authors’ focus on the technical aspects of the Taylor rule seems
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Fig. 4C.1 Rate of inﬂation in Japan
Source: Ministry of Public Management, Home Aﬀairs, Posts and Telecommunications.to indicate that they are of the view that the BOJ has been following the rule
in setting monetary policy. This is simply not correct. The Taylor rule is a
useful benchmark. The BOJ has not, however, blindly followed the rule. In
fact, as the authors correctly point out, it is possible to produce a fairly
wide range for the optimal level of the policy interest rate using the Taylor
rule, depending on assumptions about the parameters of the rule or about
the method to calculate the output gap.
Focusing too much on the Taylor rule is, however, problematic not so
much because of the diﬃculty of its implementation, but because the BOJ
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Fig. 4C.2 Estimates of real interest rates, 1922–1935
Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce; Bank of Japan.
Fig. 4C.3 Estimates of real interest rates, 1991–2003
Note:Real interest rates are calculated as gross interest payments divided by total debt minus
the rate of increase in the deﬂator for domestic demand.
Source: Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet Oﬃce.has attempted to use measures that produce stronger easing eﬀects than,
say, the Taylor rule. Under the Taylor rule, a central bank keeps the inter-
est rate at zero so long as the rule says the rate should be either zero or neg-
ative. In order to produce stronger easing eﬀects, the BOJ has made com-
mitments regarding the duration of a zero rate. In April 1999 the BOJ
announced that it would “keep the overnight rate at zero until deﬂationary
concerns are over.” The framework was in place until August 2000. Under
current quantitative easing, ample liquidity provision—eﬀectively a zero
rate—is promised to continue until actual and expected CPI inﬂation turn
positive.
The essence of such an approach is stated in Krugman (1998). Once the
ZLB is hit due to, say, a large exogenous decline in the natural rate of inter-
est, a further increase in the money supply today has no eﬀect on the econ-
omy. Assuming, however, that there is a nonzero probability that the econ-
omy is pushed out of the ZLB as a result of an exogenous rise in the natural
rate of interest tomorrow, a promise today of monetary expansion tomor-
row will raise inﬂation expectations today and stimulate aggregate demand.
It is at once apparent that such a commitment ought to be stronger than
what the market naturally assumes about future monetary policy in the ab-
sence of the commitment. Otherwise, it will not aﬀect expectations. There
are two ways to achieve this end. One is the announcement of a very high
inﬂation target. As Krugman puts it, “the central bank needs to announce
that it will be irresponsible.” The other is to commit to, in the event of a rise
in the natural rate of interest, slower increases in the interest rate than a
baseline monetary policy, say, the Taylor rule, suggests. In this case, the tar-
get rate of inﬂation does not have to be very high; however, the possibility
of inﬂation temporarily overshooting its target needs to be tolerated.
Clearly, what the BOJ has been doing is closer to the second of the two ap-
proaches. In any case, these approaches are already “nonconventional” in
the sense that they have not been employed elsewhere except by the BOJ
and, to a lesser extent, recently by the Fed. Baba et al. (2004) shows that
they have had some signiﬁcant eﬀects on the term-structure of interest
rates. It is also important, however, to recognize the limitations of the ap-
proach.
Essentially, the approach requires forces other than monetary policy for
stimulating the economy. As a result, it can become very strained when
such forces are weak. In the Krugman version, a lower probability of the
economy moving out of the ZLB tomorrow requires a correspondingly
higher inﬂation target. Very soon, the target becomes incredible because of
time inconsistency problems.1 The second approach, for example, raising
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1. To put this diﬀerently, if the announcement of high inﬂation targets is credible, there is
no limit to the power of a permanent increase in base money to stimulate the economy. This
point is made in the McCallum chapter in this volume.interest rates more slowly than the Taylor rule as the economy improves,
only starts to exert large eﬀects on medium- to long-term interest rates
when such improvements in the economy are expected to occur very soon.
A central bank may have to wait a desperately long time before such im-
provements take place. Improvements in the economy may not materialize
under the policy board that made the decision. As King (2004) points out,
the diﬃculty here is one of “collective decisions today may fail to bind fu-
ture collective decisions.” In any case, these points have to be at the center
of discussion in any evaluation of the BOJ’s recent monetary policy.
Finally, Ito and Mishkin’s discussion of the pros and cons of other non-
conventional monetary-policy measures in the neighborhood of the ZLB
is very reasonable. If I might add some obvious points, foreign exchange in-
tervention may help in raising the price level. In the Japanese context, how-
ever, the BOJ is not allowed to carry out exchange rate policy, which is in
the hands of the MOF. The MOF, who has the power to carry out large in-
terventions, ironically does not have the mandate to maintain price stabil-
ity. Ito and Mishkin note various problems with operations in private real
assets. I agree with most of what they say here. I would have then thought
that the decision on whether or not to use such operations would be a func-
tion of how desperate the situation of the economy was. In fact, the BOJ
has been buying asset-backed securities since 2003 as a monetary-policy
action, and equities from private banks since 2002 as a prudential policy
measure. These reﬂected the BOJ’s judgment that the economy was in a se-
rious situation, hence the use of some risky operations were justiﬁed, but
that the situation was not desperate, therefore, they should be carried out
with an eye to minimizing the negative eﬀects of such operations on private
resource allocation.
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